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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE CANADIAN BOYCOTT OF THE 1980 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES

by



SANDRA LEE KERELIUK

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE CANADIAN BOYCOTT OF THE 1980 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES submitted by SANDRA LEE KERELIUK in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

Dedication

To my parents

Abstract

An attempt has been made to determine if pressure was exerted upon the Canadian Olympic Association to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.

In order to understand how the boycott weapon evolved in the Modern Olympic Movement, a historical overview of the protests and problems which have occurred in the previous Modern Olympics is documented. It was found that during their 84 year history the Games have evolved from a transnationalistic event to a nationalistic encounter. As the Olympics grew in size and stature, they developed into an event of global importance influenced by international trends, conflicts and events.

However, with the possible exception of the 1936 Games, the Olympics never captured the centre spotlight of international politics until the boycott crisis of the 1980 Summer Olympics. When Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR in December 1979, it unintentionally became the catalyst for the most blatant sport-politics clash in Modern Olympic history. The invasion caused a Moscow-Washington clash and American president Jimmy Carter, who had experienced success against the Soviets with a 1978 boycott threat, called for a massive Western boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games.

Because of Canada's position as a strong ally and geopolitical neighbour of the USA, it immediately became involved in the boycott issue. Since the Canadian Olympic Association was the only group who could officially support and enforce a Canadian boycott, it became the target of pressure from a combination of critical power groups who wanted Canada to boycott. The combination was formed among the Olympic Trust, the Canadian government, the American government, and American businesses.

In the end, the Canadian Olympic Association's decision to boycott was reached as a result of the political and financial pressure exerted upon it by these groups.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

During the later months of 1880 tenant farmers in the area of Mayo, Ireland became disenchanted with their governmental land agreement, and with the methods their landlord used to extract rents from them. The farmers held meetings and discussed the types of levers which the tenants of Mayo, and of Ireland, could apply to elicit an improved land bill. The Mayo group resolved to demonstrate their discontent against their own landlord.

Rather than malevolently shooting the landlord, it was suggested that a "more Christian and charitable way, which would give the sinner time to repent", should be employed.¹ A detailed form of social and moral excommunication was developed and it was effectively utilized against the landlord. His name was Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott. This incident caused Boycott not only to become the first victim of organized ostracism, but also for his name to become a standard term in the English vocabulary.² From this episode the boycott tool was implemented and within 100 years it would have been used on numerous occasions to put pressure on individuals, social units and governments. Included in this was the Modern Olympic Games.

The Olympics were revived during the latter part of the 1800's and the first Modern Games were held in 1896 in Athens. The structure of the Games enticed political interference from the start. Flags, anthems and national teams were advocated and not only did this help politicize the Games, but it allowed the movement to serve as a political forum.³

The Modern Olympic Games became a product of existing international trends, pressures, conflicts and events, unresolved issues from prior Games, and past decisions taken to deal with these issues.⁴ The Games became a partial reflection of the global

¹ Joyce Marlow, *Captain Boycott and the Irish* (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1973), p.135.

² Ibid.

³ Andrew Strenk, "What Price Victory? The World of International Sports and Politics", *The Annals of the American Academy*, 445 (September 1979), p.139.

⁴ Richard Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), p.176.

political structure. What had begun as a challenge for the youth of the world evolved into a battle for superiority by the participating nations. Between the time an Olympic boycott was first applied in 1904 by several Americans in two track events, to the complete withdrawal of 62 nations in 1980, success in the Games had become a measure of greatness.

When the geopolitically delicate country of Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR in December 1979, it unintentionally became the catalyst for the largest boycott and most blatant sport-politics clash in Modern Olympic Games history. Ten days after the initial invasion American President Jimmy Carter, who had successfully applied a boycott threat against the USSR to release Soviet dissidents in 1978⁵, suggested a Moscow boycott as a retaliatory measure and as a possible lever to pry Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In the following months the boycott threat caught the attention of the world. Never before had a crisis in an international sporting event held so high a profile for so long a period throughout much of the literate world.

Because of Canada's position as a strong ally and geopolitical neighbour of the USA, it immediately became involved in the boycott issue. The Canadian Olympic Association (COA) and the federal government were at odds with each other over the boycott issue from the beginning. Shortly after Carter's 4 January boycott threat announcement Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark offered the USA initial support by declaring trading restrictions with the USSR. He did not express immediate boycott agreement, but proposed tacit support by suggesting a venue switch instead.⁶

During this period COA President Richard (Dick) Pound informed the public that the association would defy any government decree to withdraw from the Moscow Olympics. The association felt its athletes should attend since there was no threat of hostility toward them.⁷

The government disregarded the COA statement and on 27 January Clark announced governmental support for the American-led boycott. However, the Clark decision was rendered powerless when Pierre Elliot Trudeau and the Liberal Party won a sweeping federal election victory over Clark and the Conservative Party. Trudeau offered

⁵ Phillip K. Shinnik, "Progressive Resistance to Nationalism and the 1980 Boycott of the Moscow Olympics", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, (Fall/Winter 1982), p.15.

⁶ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 12 January 1980, p.1.

⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 8 January 1980, p.33.

a noncommittal attitude toward the issue and kept Canada's position in a state of uncertainty for a prolonged period. During this time the COA voted to send its athletes to the Moscow Games.

Eventually, both the federal government and the COA voted to withdraw Canadian athletes from the 1980 Moscow Summer Games. Why did both groups decide that the athletes should forfeit the chance of competing in the Olympics? What were the factors and who were the groups that had an impact on the final decision?

Statement of the Problem

Was pressure exerted against the Canadian Olympic Association to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympic Games against its principles, against its constitution and against the wishes of the majority of athletes

OR,

did the Canadian Olympic Association boycott the 1980 Summer Olympic Games *without* the influence of external pressure?

Major Hypothesis

The Canadian Olympic Association decided to support the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games because of the pressure exerted on it by a number of critical power groups.

Related Hypotheses

1. The federal government of the USA exerted pressure against the federal government of Canada to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympic Games.
2. The federal government of Canada exerted pressure against the Canadian Olympic Association to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympic Games.
3. American businesses exerted pressure against the Olympic Trust to favor a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games.
4. The Olympic Trust exerted pressure against the Canadian Olympic Association to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympic Games.

Definition of Terms for the Study

Boycott: To join together in abstaining from participating in the XXII Summer Olympic Games in Moscow in order to protest the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Canadian Olympic Association (COA): The national Olympic committee whose key function is to represent Canadian Olympic athletes.

Critical power group: Any group, organization or agency which used its control and influence to pressure, either directly or indirectly, the COA into boycotting the Moscow Olympic Games. The identified critical power groups in this study are the American government, the Canadian government, American businesses and the Olympic Trust.

International Olympic Committee (IOC): The policy-setting body which directs the Olympic Movement, including the quadrennial presentation of the Olympic Games.

Majority: An amount equalling more than one-half.

Modern Olympic Games: The name given to the revived version of the Games of Ancient Greece. The Modern Olympic Games encompass the period between 1896 and the present.⁸

Olympiad: The four year period separating the actual Games competition.

Olympism: The philosophy of sport in life which exemplifies the aims of the Olympic Movement to:

...promote the development of those fine physical and moral qualities which are the basis of amateur sport, and to bring together the athletes of the world in a great quadrennial festival of sports thereby creating international respect and goodwill and thus helping to construct a better and more peaceful world.⁹

Olympic Games: A competitive sport festival scheduled once every four years to celebrate Olympism.

Olympic Ideal: A synonym for Olympism.

Olympic Trust (OT): A group of Canada's most influential businessmen which acts as the COA's primary fundraiser. It was responsible for obtaining 1.7 million dollars of the 2 million dollars needed to send a Canadian team to Moscow.

Politics: The competition between groups and/or individuals for power and leadership through the guiding and influencing of policies and/or the winning and

⁸ For the purposes of this study the words Games and Modern Olympic Games are used interchangeably.

⁹ Jean Marion Leiper, "The International Olympic Committee: The Pursuit of Olympism 1894 - 1970" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1976), pp.17-18.

holding of control over a governing body.

Pressure: The compelling force and influence of a group, organization or agency on a group or individual.

Protest: To make an objection to, to express disapproval of, or to speak strongly against, an idea, an act or a course of action.¹⁰

Sports Festival: A celebration in which athletes compete in sport events and spectators observe their athletic excellence.

United States Olympic Committee (USOC): The national Olympic Committee whose key function is to represent American Olympic athletes.

Justification of the Problem

1. The Modern Olympic Games have continually been proclaimed by many as an international event free of political ties. Through the documentation of the evolution of the Games, it will be possible to understand how their inherent political structure has lured the increasing political involvement of the participating nations and how this has made some of the ideals of the Games fallacious.
2. The documentation of the numerous protests of the Games is necessary in order to comprehend how the foundation for boycotts of the Games (and hence the 1980 boycott) have been put in place and how boycotts have become a consistent problem of the Olympics.
3. The political events surrounding the 1980 Moscow Olympics have, more than any of the Games, displayed the problems associated with international sport festivals. Although the COA and the USOC both attempted to be politically autonomous groups, the political boycott displayed how deep the ties of the associations actually are. The documentation of the boycott will help to ascertain if it is still possible or reasonable to remain autonomous.
4. It is historically important to document, analyze and interpret the facts surrounding the Canadian decision to boycott the Moscow Games for the following reasons:
 - a. It will add to the body of knowledge surrounding the development of politically caused sport crises in Canada. The COA probably undertook its most political action ever when it agreed to join the boycott. The "how" and

¹⁰ David C. Hoy, "The Proposed African Boycott of the XI Commonwealth Games" (M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1979), p.4.

"why" of these actions must be properly recorded.

- b. The concept of an American Olympic Games boycott as a sanction against the USSR's actions in Afghanistan was proposed both prematurely and in absolutism and this was principally due to a lack of both background information and of comprehension of the the functions of the Olympic Games. Thus, the conclusions may offer Olympic decision makers rational guidelines for future decisions. Historical research has little meaning if we do not learn from and attempt to understand previous actions.

Limitations of the Study

The following items may have had an impact on the study:

1. There may have been an incomplete analysis and interpretation of documents obtained during the course of research due to the limitation of the number and representativeness of the compiled information.
2. There was difficulty in obtaining all the relevant information because of financial constraints.
3. Due to the recent occurrence of the event more detailed records and proceedings were unavailable at the time of writing. This generated an incomplete dissemination of relevant information which may have led to a biased analysis.
4. The interview technique, in relation to the accuracy of statements by the persons interviewed, and personal biases of the interviewer, may have had an impact on the study.

Delimitations of the Study

For the purposes of this study, the research will be delimited to the following:

1. The emphasis of the study will be twofold:
 - a. To describe the past protests of the Modern Olympic Games which set precedents for, and solidified, the trends of the Games. In order to thoroughly document these trends the major political events of each Olympiad will also be described.
 - b. To describe and interpret the events which led up to the Canadian boycott of the Moscow Games.
2. The time period of the research shall be the following:

- a. The protests of the Games will be described from the first Modern Olympic Games in 1896 to the twenty-first Modern Olympic Games in 1976.
- b. The development of the Canadian boycott will be taken from the point when the USSR first invaded Afghanistan to the time the COA announced its formal boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

Objectives of the Study

1. To historically document the past Olympic protests and their influences on the ensuing trends of the Modern Olympic Games.
2. To chronologically describe and to analyze the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR.
3. To chronologically describe and to analyze the development and implementation of the boycott sanction by the USA.
4. To chronologically describe and to analyze the decision by Canada to participate in the boycott.
5. To describe the impact of the boycott on the USSR, the Moscow Games and the Olympic Movement.
6. To provide supplementary information on the influence of politics in the Modern Olympic Games.
7. To identify areas of further study.

Methods and Procedure

This study made primary use of the descriptive research method. A varied range of research techniques were implemented including the following:

A. Collection of Data

1. For the purposes of describing the protests of the past Olympic Games, data was collected through library research which focussed on textbooks and journal articles.
2. For the purposes of describing and analyzing the Canadian boycott of the Moscow Olympics the following techniques were used:
 - a. Official Records COA minutes
Athletes meetings minutes
 - b. Published Materials

- 1) Newspapers
 - Toronto Globe and Mail*
 - Edmonton Journal*
 - New York Times*
- 2) Magazines
 - Maclean's*
 - Newsweek*
 - Time*
 - Sports Illustrated*
- 3) Journal Articles
- 4) Textbooks
- c. Personal Records
 - 1) Interviews
 - Susan Nattrass (athlete's representative)
 - Geoff Elliott (sport administrator)

For both areas, the data collected was placed chronologically on a time line. Data was described in terms of its effect on trends for section (1) and the 1980 Canadian boycott for section (2).

B. Criticism of the Data

Data was not accepted as fact until it was subjected to external and internal criticism.

[1] External Criticism

In order to verify the authenticity of any obscure data, corroborating evidence was found before the data was stated as fact.

[2] Internal Criticism

In order to comprehend the meaning and accuracy of the statements in the documents, two questions were answered by the researcher. They were:

- 1) What did the author *mean* by each word and statement?
- 2) Were the statements the author made accurate and trustworthy?

Although this was a subjective form of analysis, it did ensure exhaustive interpretation of all documents by the researcher.

Organization of the Study

Chapter II is an historical overview of the problems and protests which have occurred during the Modern Olympic Games. The Olympic trends which developed as a

result of these problems and protests are also recorded. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the state of the world at the time of each Olympics, the major political events of each Olympiad are also documented.

Chapter III chronologically describes the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR, the development and implementation of the boycott by the USA, and the development of the decision by Canada to boycott the Moscow Games. The pressures exerted on Canada to join the boycott are detailed in this section.

Chapter IV presents a discussion and analysis of the American boycott, of the Canadian boycott, and of the impact of the boycott on the USSR, the Moscow Games, and on the Olympic Movement. The reasons behind the boycott sanction are analyzed, as well as the use of financial and political pressure on Canada, and the ultimate outcome of the boycott.

Chapter V presents a summary of the study, conclusions drawn from the study, and recommendations for future study, research and actions.

II. A REVIEW OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PROTESTS WITHIN THE MODERN OLYMPIC GAMES

Introduction

It seems to us more necessary than ever before, if only from the point of view of political morality, to show just how fallacious the ideology behind the Olympic Games is, how it serves to maintain the balance of forces between the great powers and how it contributes to the gigantic operation of regimentation and dehumanization which is behind the entire practice of a certain type of sport.¹

It seemed to be the impending fate of the Modern Olympic Games that they would be influenced by the political events of the world in which they existed. Baron Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the Modern Games, ostensibly assured this outcome when he stated his belief that the Games would usher in an era of world peace and international co-operation. This action served to politicize sport, for if sport was to be used to influence the world's structure, there would have to be reciprocating action. Flags, anthems and national teams promoted nationalism during the Games. Not only did this politicize the structure of the Games but the Movement, as De Coubertin organized it, became ideally suited to serve as a political forum.²

Problems were inherent in the *structure* of the Modern Games from their inception. Built-in faults were simply waiting to be exploited. Espy classifies the major faults as a direct result of the basic forces on the world scene which influence the Olympic posture.³ They are nationalism, internationalism, and transnationalism. These forces will emerge as major faults of the Games and on this basis, it is important for them to be well defined.

When a nation becomes an entity which an individual can identify with and accept, then it becomes a part of that individual. This causes that person's political loyalty to bond to the nation and thus, nationalism occurs. By extending this force of loyalty between nations, internationalism prevails. However, the individual's *primary* feelings of loyalty are toward his/her own nation, and the relationship between nations is simply a showcase for

¹ Jean-Marie Brohm, *Sport - A Prison Of Measured Time*, 2nd. ed. (London: Ink Links, 1978), p.103.

² Andrew Strenk, "What Price Victory? The World of International Sports and Politics", *The Annals of the American Academy*, 445 (September, 1979): 139.

³ Richard Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), pp.9-10.

enhancing his/her nation's interests. (Examples would include the formation of allied forces during a war, and the uniting of single forces into a unified group for purposes of a boycott.)

Transnationalism appears when non-governmental individuals operate outside of their national boundaries (as the International Olympic Committee purports to do). It is closely intertwined with nationalism and hence, its strength depends on the strength of the individual's nation at that time. Those people holding the greatest national power and loyalty will be able to transfer that power to the transnational group.⁴

These forces are found in the Olympic Movement. They are caused by both the structure of the Games, and the ever-changing world political scene. The above statements may be supported by reviewing the political discordances of the Modern Olympic Games. By specifically focussing on the trends of nationalism, internationalism and transnationalism, the following points will be argued:

1. That the ideology of the Games is somewhat fallacious;
2. That the Games have been victimized by politics from their inception;
3. That these trends are a partial result of the world political structure; and
4. That these trends (and others) will continue to develop in accordance with the ever-changing political trends of the world.

In order to thoroughly document these trends, the following procedure will be implemented. The major political events which occurred during the time-span between the Olympics (termed an Olympiad) are documented in order to facilitate a better understanding of the state of the world at the time of each Olympics. Any problems or protests which occurred during the Games and which contribute to the major trends are also documented. The problems of the Modern Olympic Games must be reviewed in order to show how the Games evolved into such a prestigious event, and how, by 1980, a boycott threat had become such a powerful tool.

⁴ Ibid.

The Protests of the Modern Olympic Games

Historical Introduction

Imperialism was the dominant force during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The great western powers, with the exception of Austria, were engaged in colonial expansion. During this time the sphere of influence of the United States of America (USA) was also expanding at an unprecedented pace. The sovereignty of the USA, Britain, and Germany had been established in the Samoan Archipelago of 1899.

In conjunction with these events was the China–Japan War which occurred between July of 1894 and April of 1895. China was soundly defeated and it signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Cuba rebelled against Spain in 1895 and aroused the active sympathy of the USA.

1896 Athens

Although the planning for the revival of the Olympic Games began years earlier, the first Modern Olympic Games did not commence until 6 April 1896, 14 centuries after the Ancient Greek Olympic Games had ended. These first events were loosely organized and of little apparent importance at the time.⁵ Because of the relative obscurity of the first Games, related literature is limited.

The people of Greece were enthusiastic about the revived Games, but the Greek government was not. As a result, the "... Games began, as they were to continue in many instances, in a major political and social uproar."⁶ Struggling with bankruptcy, the Greek government refused financial support, and the Games were in danger of being terminated. They were rescued by the heir to the Greek throne, Constantine, who set up both organizational and financial programs.

The first Modern Olympics appeared to be free of major political intrusions. The only interesting point of note is that when the coveted marathon race was captured by a Greek, Spiridon Louis, many honors and rewards were thrust upon him by his proud countrymen. He was offered free clothing, meals, and barbering for the remainder of his life and became an instant Greek hero. Not only did this incident manifest strong nationalist feelings, but it also introduced the rewards system that some future

⁵ John Kieran and Arthur Daley, *The Story of the Olympic Games: 776BC to 1972* (New York: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1973), p.23.

⁶ Lord Killanin and John Rodda, *The Olympic Games* (London: Rainbird Reference Books Ltd., 1976), p.27.

participants would exploit as the prime motivator for participation – far from the Olympic Ideal.

1896 - 1900 Historical Review

During this first Modern Olympiad, three major world events occurred. In 1899 the Peace Conference was held at the Hague in an attempt to limit armaments and to humanize war. However, little was achieved.⁷ The Boxer Rebellion broke out in June of 1900 and by August, Peking was occupied by international troops under German leadership. The Boer War began in 1899 and did not end until the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed in May of 1902.

1900 Paris

The Second Modern Games were held as an adjunct to the Paris exposition in an attempt to decrease organizational needs. Unfortunately, due to poor management, the Games were reduced to "... a track and field meet with a tug-of-war thrown in for good measure."⁸ Again, the Games were not of any great significance during this time, but problems were still evident.

Kieran and Daley reported that the opening ceremonies were scheduled for Sunday, 15 July, but the USA threatened to pull its athletes from the meet because competing on the Sabbath challenged their religious loyalty.⁹ The French officials grudgingly complied and opened the Games on the Saturday with the finals rescheduled for the Monday. That Saturday was the French holiday Bastille Day and, as the French had feared, spectator turnout was low. The competing nations, excluding the USA, held a secret meeting and protested the delay of the Sunday events. The French reversed their decision and ten finals were held on the Sunday. Because of the decision, two Americans boycotted the 1500 metre team final and the USA collectively withdrew from the 5000 metre team event.¹⁰ This moral problem, which was to recur in future Olympics, introduced the strength of internationalism at the Games when the remaining nations unified as a force in order to achieve their purpose. The event is also important because it marked the first time in the Modern Olympics that a boycott had taken place. It is

⁷ Marcel Dunan, ed., *Larousse Encyclopedia of Modern History From 1500 to Present Day* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p.341.

⁸ Bill Henry, *An Approved History of the Olympic Games* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons), p.61.

⁹ Kieran and Daley, pp.31–34.

¹⁰ Killanin and Rodda, p.30.

significant that the action taken was based on personal morals rather than nationalistic politics.

1900 - 1904 Historical Review

World affairs had altered somewhat. In 1904 France signed amity agreements with Britain, Italy and Spain. Although Russia had rapidly expanded, Britain and France had not made any major acquisitions. The only major outburst during this Olympiad was the Russo-Japanese War which took place between February 1904 and September 1905. The USA became involved as a mediator and Russia duly yielded land to Japan. For the first time since the rise of imperialism during the nineteenth century, Asia had gained land mass in open warfare with a European nation.

1904 St. Louis

World events had little impact on the third Modern Games, primarily because of the extremely low profile of the contests which were held in St. Louis. Kieran and Daley state that the Russo-Japanese War diverted much attention from the world's fair and in turn, the fair diverted attention from the Games.¹¹ For the second time in a row, the Olympics were held in conjunction with the fair and this made the Olympics a side show to a much larger event.

In fact, the St. Louis celebration is primarily remembered for doing very little to enhance the image of the Games. Due to the high costs and poor travelling conditions of the time, foreign turnout was very low. There were only 556 participants compared to 1074 in Paris and the majority of these were from the USA and Canada. There were no problems documented, because the low turnout decreased the importance and prominence of the Games and thus, they lacked the temptation for protests.

1904 - 1908 Historical Review

Two major shifts in the world structure occurred during this era. In 1907 Britain settled its differences with Russia when the "Triple Entente" was signed. This Anglo-Franco-Russian agreement defined each country's respective sphere of influence. Then in 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovnia in order to curb the influence of Serbia. This move strained Austro-Russian relations almost to the breaking point and proved to have serious repercussions years later when World War I broke.

¹¹ Ibid., p.39.

1908 London

Incidents depicting the spirit of nationalism occurred at the London Games. The Finns paraded without a flag during the opening ceremonies after refusing to march under the Russian banner. In another example, the Irish athletes were instructed to compete under the flag of Great Britain, but they did so only grudgingly. They had wanted to march under their own flag. Finally, the Swedish and American flags were not flown at the Olympic stadium (probably due to an oversight) but the contingents from the two countries declared themselves duly insulted.¹² All three incidents, minor as they may have appeared, were signs of the growing feelings of nationalism within the Games' framework. As the Olympics became more prominent, so did the need for political clarity and thus, national conflicts became more predominant.

However, organizational factors were also becoming a problem as the size of the Games rapidly increased. Until this time the officiating had been controlled by the host city and in London, the British judges were viewed as being very biased. The Americans felt particularly ill-treated, and were very critical of the British. Kieran and Daley noted that problems intensified to a point where the nations of Sweden, Finland, Italy, Canada, France and the USA threatened to withdraw because of the officiating.¹³ This event was of significance because it marked the first time Canada became involved in a boycott threat. It did turn out to be only a threat since a boycott of these proportions never materialized. Nevertheless, when the men's 400 metre final was ordered to be rerun, the outraged American finalists (numbering three) boycotted the race and left the British contestant, Halswelle, to run the lap to victory by himself.

These incidents, during a much more visible Games, seemed to be directly proportionate to the status of the Olympics. As the status and importance of the Games increased, so did the number of problems and incidents. Hence, when a nation's pride was at stake in a conspicuous forum, attempts to leave that pride unscarred became more frequent and more important. Roxborough also stressed the feelings of nationalism that were increasing when he noted that "... victory was becoming too important. The Nation,

¹² Kieran and Daley, p.63.

¹³ Kieran and Daley, pp.64-65.

rather than the individual, was reaping the glory.”¹⁴

The organizational problems related to the British officiating also left the Olympics more vulnerable to problems of this type and consequently, as in the world political scene, structural changes within the Olympic Organization resulted. After the London Games, the responsibility for the officiating of the actual competition was removed from the host city and awarded to each of the International Sport Governing Bodies who competed in the Games.¹⁵ The International Olympic Committee (IOC) assumed direct control of the contests, possibly because they were perceived as a transnationalistic group. Additionally, the International Athletic Federation (IAF) made a politically unprecedented decision during the Games. Roxborough noted that the IAF became the first international body to recognize Finland as a political entity.¹⁶ This verified the ability of sports organizations to confer political recognition. This was perhaps another reason for restructuring the control of the Olympics.

The Games of 1908 were important in the cycle of the Olympics for three reasons. First, because of their growing importance, there were charges that the Games should be abandoned on the basis that they fostered “. . . international enmity rather than amity.”¹⁷ For the first time, political problems overshadowed the good will attained by the Games. Second, the restructuring signalled the official entrance of transnationalism (via the IOC) into the Games. Only future contests would decide whether it was actually practised or not. Third, the Games received such attention (albeit negative) that they were recognized as an event of growing world importance. The problems which arose and the need for restructuring proved that, politically, the Olympics “had arrived”. The London Games had insured the continuance of the Olympics.

1908 - 1912 Historical Review

This era was marked both by wars and peace treaties. World leaders were undecided as to which path would become dominant, even though talk of a major war had become a dominant topic.

Possibly the most important event which occurred was the Italian-Turkish war between 1911 and October 1912. It was instigated when Italy appropriated Tripolitania

¹⁴ Henry Roxborough, *Canada at the Olympics* (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1975), p.48.

¹⁵ Kieran and Daley, pp.65-66.

¹⁶ Roxborough, p.42.

¹⁷ Kieran and Daley, p.75.

and Cyrenaica. This clash in turn caused Turkey to start the Balkan War. Many historians believe that it was this event that planted the seed for World War I.¹⁸

1912 Stockholm

If the world situation was unsettled during the preceding Olympiad, at least the purpose of the Games had become much clearer. While the major powers were making a wide range of political moves in the world, it was the tiny nations that grasped the opportunity to gain national attention in the Olympic spotlight. The impressive results of countries such as Sweden and Finland gave them striking prominence in the Olympic forum, whereas they had been unable to garner it in the political sphere. Distance runner Hannes Kolehmainen of Finland was one of the superstars of the Games and, as Roxborough put it, "His victories came at an opportune time, when the little Scandinavian country was struggling for its freedom and recognition as a nation."¹⁹

The IOC also noted signs of the growing level of nationalism and the decrease in internationalism at the Games. Finland had wished to participate as an independent group but the Russian government intervened. The Tsarist government insisted they carry the Russian flag and the Finns complied.²⁰ Bohemia also demanded individual recognition but this was protested by the powers of Austria–Hungary. Hence, rulings by governments were becoming commonplace.

1912 - 1920 Historical Review

The Games of 1916 had been awarded to the city of Berlin but they were never celebrated. The devastation of World War I made it impossible for them to take place. One of the great turning points in history occurred on 28 June 1914, when Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austria–Hungary throne, was assassinated by a Bosnian.²¹ This incident prompted Austria to declare war and ultimately was the spark that set-off the first World War.

At the outbreak of the war, Russia was allied with France and England against the central powers of Germany and Austria–Hungary. The USA remained disengaged, but it was the 1917 Russian Revolution that largely forced the American Congress to declare

¹⁸ Duncan, pp.344–346.

¹⁹ Roxborough, p.51.

²⁰ Killanin and Rodda, p.41.

²¹ Louis L. Snyder, *Great Turning Points in History* (Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971) pp.123–128.

war in order to assist the weakened France and England. By 29 September 1918, the Armistice was signed between the Allied powers and Bulgaria. Within two months Turkey, Austria–Hungary and Germany had signed. By 28 June 1919, the Versailles Peace Treaty had been certified and it came into force on 10 January 1920. On the same date, the League of Nations came into existence.

Another historical event which occurred during this time was the founding of the Fascist Party by Mussolini in Italy, 1919, a move which would have an impact on future Olympics.

The final year was marked by peace treaties. The treaty of St. Germain–en–Laye was concluded between the Allies and Austria on 10 September 1919. The Trianon Peace Treaty between Hungary and the Allied powers was authorized on 4 June 1920. Austria declared peace with China on 21 June 1920, and Finland and the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) agreed to a truce on 15 October 1920. (Finland had separated from Russia just after the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917). The Dorpat treaty between the USSR and Estonia was similarly concluded in 1920. These papers, along with the numerous others signed during this period, gave strong evidence that the nations were tired of war. After such a destructive era, it was time for conciliation.

1920 Antwerp

The attempts at good will in the world structure were carried over into the Olympic forum. With the armistice having been authorized just 18 months before the Olympics, little preparation time was afforded the hosts. Any problems were generally attributed to a lack of organization and not political manoeuvres. The competing nations recognized the host's situation and performed as gracious participants.

Germany and Austria, late enemy nations of Belgium and the Allies, were not invited to the Games. Belgium, as the host, had the task of issuing invitations and decided it would be unwise to invite those nations.²² Thus, absolutism was not carried to an extreme, and this further strengthened the status of the Olympics as a political forum.

Another incident occurred just before the 1920 Olympic events began. The American athletes threatened to remain out of the competition unless the United States

²² Henry, p. 135.

Olympic Committee (USOC) improved their travel accommodations and reinstated one of their peers for the Games. Their wishes were granted and the athletes competed. The incident demonstrated the influence and status of Olympic athletes to their countries. This trend would fluctuate greatly in the Olympic cycle. Later Games would demonstrate that administrators and athletes would both compete for increased status in the Games. Unfortunately, each would gain at the other's expense.

The Antwerp Games, hastily organized and administratively weak, demonstrated a lull in political problems. They mirrored the disheveled post-war world structure which had also attempted to control its organizational problems through peace treaties. After experiencing turmoil and devastation from the war period, the nations were not anxious for a repeat performance in the Olympic stadium. Except for the Germany and Austria snub, it was obvious that the Games and the world were both seeking peace.

1920 - 1924 Historical Review

This Olympiad was truly a time of apparent reconciliation. Numerous peace treaties were ratified during the interval. The Riga Peace Treaty between the USSR and Latvia was signed on 9 August 1920. After the Polish-Soviet War (April 1920 – 18 March 1921) Poland joined the treaty. The treaty of Rapallo re-established diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia on 16 April 1922 after Italy and Yugoslavia had ratified their intentions on 12 November 1920.

Additionally, the "Little Entente" marked the alliance between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia which Rumania joined in August of 1920. The USA signed a treaty with China in 1922. On 22 July 1923, the Lausanne Treaty was adopted by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and the other Allied powers as well as the USSR and Turkey, in order to revise the terms of the Sevres accord (signed 10 August 1920). In 1924, France signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia.

Nationally, Egypt claimed her independence in 1920 and Great Britain granted official recognition on 15 March 1922. Southern Ireland then became an independent free state as a member of the British Commonwealth when the Treaty of London was authorized on 6 December 1921. Finally, China and Canada recognized the government of the USSR.

1924 Chamonix and Paris

A similar parallel between the Olympic structure and the world structure was again noted. The period between Antwerp and Paris was also one of great activity.²³ In what would become automatic and frequent in later years, initial meetings of the IOC and the international federations were held in order to standardize the Games, iron out problems beforehand, and insure proper management by the correct authorities. This mirrored the purposes of the treaties.

A major result of the planning was the staging of the first separate Winter Olympic Games at Chamonix, France. A much larger winter program was offered than at previous Olympics (where sports such as hockey and figure skating had taken place) and the celebration mushroomed over the years. However, the Winter Games never achieved the status of the Summer Games.

Fuoss reported that "...there has been little adverse criticism or laudatory comments on the 1924 Winter Games."²⁴ This was probably due to the low profile and lack of attention given these Games. They began, and continued to be, significantly overshadowed by the Summer Games.

The Paris Games were favorably reported by several others.²⁵ However, Fuoss offered insight into some trend-setting incidents.²⁶ After the USA defeated France for the rugby gold medal, a major fight broke out among the spectators. In another instance, the crowd booed loudly at the medal ceremonies for the boxing welterweight fight in order to voice its displeasure over the decision which had favored a Belgian over the apparently superior Argentinian fighter. These incidents, however minor, served to demonstrate not only the strong feelings of "fair play" from the spectators, but their emerging influence as well.

The decision of the middleweight boxing final was reversed when heavy pressure was placed on the officials by the spectators, participants and correspondents. The English speaking nations of Canada, the USA, Britain, Australia and South Africa had threatened to withdraw in a body if the decision had not been overturned. This again

²³ Ibid., p.153.

²⁴ Donald E. Fuoss, "An Analysis of the Incidents in the Olympic Games from 1924 to 1948, With Reference to the Contribution of the Games to International Good Will and Understanding." (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1951) p.53.

²⁵ Killanin and Rodda, p.13; Roxborough, p.60; Kieran and Daley, p.102; Henry, p.150.

²⁶ Fuoss, pp.54-57.

signalled the increasing power and influence of a boycott threat at the Games.

A final incident proved significant enough to warrant the call for Britain to withdraw from future Olympics. During the individual sabre contests an Italian handily beat his teammates and they were subsequently charged with collusion. The Italian was disqualified and his three countrymen withdrew from the final match. This incident, when added to the other disputes, caused the following editorials to be penned. The *Times* stated that because of these incidents Britain should withdraw from future Olympics for "...the death-knell of the Olympic Games has, in fact, been sounded."²⁷ Another *Times* editorial reported the much inferred reflection that:

Before Olympic Games can do any good, all nations must learn equally to regard sport and politics as two separate and independent spheres, which at present not all nations seem to do.²⁸

The idea that sport and politics should be separate entities is still argued today.

The uproar which these comparatively minor incidents caused was owed to the greater prominence bestowed on the Olympics by the public sector and the media. This attention would prove to be an extension of the growing force of nationalism.

1924 - 1928 Historical Review

The major aspect of this Olympiad appeared to be the maintenance of the status quo as the world remained relatively stable. There were few instances of divergence from this pattern. Relationships among some South American nations were strained at times, highlighted by the Bolivia-Paraguay War in 1925, but generally the mood of this area was one of calm. France had actively pursued peace and initiated accords with Poland in 1925 and Rumania in 1926.

1928 St. Moritz and Amsterdam

A new level of prosperity in Olympic competition was achieved in 1928. More nations participated, many countries showed increased abilities, overall conditions were improved, the events were well handled and there were few unpleasant events.²⁹ The Games, deemed the most successful of the Modern era to date, duplicated the harmony of the state of the world.³⁰ In an iteration of the first Winter Games, a very friendly atmosphere surrounded the St. Moritz competition, and there were no detrimental

²⁷ Ibid., p.70.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Henry, p.185.

³⁰ Fuoss, p.105.

international episodes to mar the celebrations.³¹ Even though there was an increase in participation of nine countries (from 16 to 25), no major problems occurred.

The Amsterdam competitions were generally harmonious but there were minor incidents which deserve to be reviewed. The French team did not participate in the opening ceremonies after its national pride was injured by a belligerent gatekeeper who had refused to allow them into the stadium the day before for a practise session.³² They had initially threatened to withdraw from the entire festival but they settled amiably because they felt their team showed promise of a strong showing. In this instance, the insult to French pride was not significant enough to outweigh the prestige the nation would gain if its team performed successfully.

During the ceremonies a second minor incident took place. The USA refused to dip its flag, or salute the dignitaries at the reviewing stand. In fact, the USA had not dipped the stars and stripes since 1904. It was American policy that its flag would not be lowered to anyone and the Americans must have felt that the political overtones of the Games did not permit them to make an exception.

Several boxing controversies occurred due to allegedly inadequate officiating.³³ The American boxing manager became so disgusted that he wanted to protest by withdrawing the entire boxing team. The USOC president, James McArthur, disallowed this action and nothing further came of it. The incident is of interest in that it denotes how quickly the boycott method can be threatened. Indeed, the boycott was emerging as a main protesting implement for the Olympics. However, it must be repeated that the 1928 Games were comparatively peaceful.

1928 - 1932 Historical Review

The years following the Amsterdam Games were marked by relatively peaceful relations among nations while they were marred by economic despair. Sixty-three countries (including Canada, the USSR, Germany, Japan and China) signed the Kellogg Pact which rejected war as a means of settling international disputes. It became effective on 24 July 1929. The Eastern Pact was concluded between the USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, and Persia by April 1929. There were, however, signs of

³¹ Ibid., p.84.

³² Killanin and Rodda, p.117.

³³ Fuoss, pp.94-100.

several international disputes as China and the USSR broke off relations in June of 1929.

A major economic crisis occurred during this Olympiad. It was instigated by the American Stock Exchange panic of 28 September 1929, from which repercussions were felt world-wide. The other event of importance of this era occurred when Hitler's party increased its seat total in the German government from 12 to 107 seats during the national elections held 14 September 1930. This marked the beginning of Hitler's rapid rise to power which would greatly effect not only the Olympic Movement, but the world as well.

1932 Lake Placid and Los Angeles

The third celebration of the Winter Games was not as successful as had been initially anticipated. This was due to poor weather conditions, winter travel problems and a world-wide economic depression.³⁴ In fact, the 1932 Winter Olympics have the unfavorable distinction of tallying the lowest total of participants for any Winter Games. They attracted only 17 countries and 278 participants. This was one instance where uncontrollable factors rather than calculated moves caused problems for the Games.

The economic situation had improved by the summer and this had a positive effect on the more prestigious Summer Games. Los Angeles offered additional examples of the growing trends of nationalism and boycotting. Paavo Nurmi, the great Finnish runner and hero, was suspended from the Olympics for accepting appearance money and thus forfeiting his amateur status. The members of the Finnish team immediately threatened to exclude themselves from the Games "...to support their nation."³⁵ Eventually, they agreed to "...go ahead and do our best, relying on future developments to atone for this great wrong to Finland."³⁶ It is interesting to note that they felt their entire country had been insulted. This reaction was to become the norm as the spirit of nationalism continued to grow.

For the most part, the Games were triumphant. Kieran and Daley noted that even though the civilized countries were suffering through a staggering depression, the Games were still a success.³⁷ Wars always effected the Olympics, yet the depression did not cause any political incidents. This was probably because it was difficult to blame any

³⁴ Ibid., p.106.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p.129.

³⁷ Kieran and Daley, p.151.

nation for the world depression, yet it was simple to accuse a country of initiating a war. Clearly, non-political problems did not cause ill feelings during the Games.

1932 - 1936 Historical Review

This era was a period of troublesome problems and growing uncertainty throughout the world. Although many events occurred during this era, it is important to focus on the major happenings which immediately preceded the Summer Olympics. Kieran and Daley recorded them as the following:

1. Japan was dismissed from the League of Nations for invading Manchuko
2. Italy overtook Ethiopia.
3. Haile Selassie was overthrown by Mussolini.
4. France was under the ruling of a socialist-coalition government headed by Leon Blum.
5. Political turmoil raged through Greece.
6. Austria was troubled by internal dissension.
7. The USSR emerged as a threatening force against China and Japan.
8. Britain and France had become angered that the German airship Hindenburg had flown over fortified parts of their territory.
9. Hitler was supreme commander in Germany.
10. Spain was engaged in a civil war.
11. Fascist and Communist forces were at odds and talk of World War II was prevalent.³⁸

1936 Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Berlin

As would become standard for future Olympics, the majority of controversial events occurred *before* the Games began. An intense boycott campaign took place in the USA in the Olympiad before Berlin. The public became strongly opposed to fielding a team for the Summer Olympics. The "Committee on Fair Play" was established in New York to lobby for a Games boycott. Its stance was summed up in a booklet entitled *Preserve the Olympic Ideal*. It stated:

The issue is whether Nazi policies and activities in the realm of sports and in conjunction with the Olympic Games themselves are of such a character as to make it impossible for the Games to be held in Nazi Germany in the true spirit of sportsmanship and of the Olympics. If the United States participates in the German Games after knowing these facts [political wrongdoings] it will necessarily appear to give its approval to the policies the Germans have used in selecting their team, Aryan race only – no Jewish or Black athletes, exploiting the Games, and the violation of the Olympic code and principles.³⁹

The Committee justified its feelings by offering materials written in a German publication, *The Spirit of Sports in the National Socialist Ideology*, which admitted the propagandist uses expected of the Berlin Olympics. The official Nazi publication stated the following:

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 153–154.

³⁹ Fuoss, p. 146.

According to the teachings of the so-called Liberals, sport is supposed to be a unity link between nations. International sport meets are sponsored in the spirit of reconciliation. Frenchmen kiss the cheeks of German girls, roses and flags are exchanged, national anthems are played and "clever" words of "peace" are spoken – but all the sport in the world cannot cancel those shameful paragraphs in the Versailles Treaty regarding the war guilt.⁴⁰

However, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) of the USA mounted its own call for participation in order to counter the Fair Play group. In the end the AAU, under the powerful leadership of its President Avery Brundage, agreed to participate by a count of 58.25 to 55.75.⁴¹

Canada also became involved in the boycott issue but never to the extent of the USA. Still, it was the largest Canadian boycott threat in Modern Olympic history up to that time. The AAU of Canada voted to participate after limited opposition was voiced by the Canadian public. The *Toronto Daily Star* recorded the decision on 22 November 1935, when Lou Marsh noted:

The decision was . . . as anticipated. Canada has no real reason for dropping out of the Olympics unless Great Britain decides to withdraw. The meeting was bombarded with wires and resolutions from those who would have Canada withdraw on political grounds, but the only effect was an increase in the telegraph and postal revenues.⁴²

In the end, Canada simply followed the lead of the British Olympic Committee (BOC). The outcome was generally expected for, in Modern Olympic history to date, Canada had never seriously considered boycotting on its own initiative.

A boycott threat emerged in Europe as well. An international conference to strengthen the boycott campaign was held in Paris on 6–7 June 1936. Delegates attended from France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Britain, and Spain. However, a mandate was not reached to boycott Berlin. It was decided though, as reported in *L'Humanite*, that a people's Olympic Games would be held in Barcelona as an alternative to the Summer Olympics. They would ". . . defend the true Olympic spirit of peace and equality among races".⁴³

Approximately 1700 people travelled to Barcelona for the event (including six Canadians) but on the morning of the scheduled opening ceremonies a Franco-led

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.151.

⁴¹ Peter Graham and Horst Ueberhorst, eds., *The Modern Olympics* (Cornwall, N.Y.: Leisure Press, 1976) p.172.

⁴² Bruce Kidd, "Canadian Opposition to the 1936 Olympics in Germany", *Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education*, 9 (2), (December 1978): 31.

⁴³ Bruce Kidd, "The Popular Front and the 1936 Olympics" *Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education*, 9 (1), (May, 1980): 12.

uprising erupted in the Barcelona barracks. The government restored order in the city within a few days but the Games were cancelled.⁴⁴

Even though the Olympic Games of 1936 were not boycotted the damage of the uprisings in the various countries left a political scar on the Olympics that would prove irreparable.

While no noticeable international incidents occurred to disrupt the Winter Games, the mere celebration of the Games in Germany added to the controversy of the Berlin Games. The Nazi environment which surrounded the event helped to add public ammunition for the attack on the Berlin Games.⁴⁵

Once the Summer Games began, the storm had calmed, but there were still numerous incidents which marred the event. The Spanish squad, which was already in the Olympic Village, was withdrawn at the last moment. Victims of internal political problems, its members were sent home to assist in the civil war. Separate Brazilian political parties sent rival Olympic teams to Berlin in order to demonstrate their authority in their own country. The Olympic arbiters wisely decided not to recognize one over another (and thus give that party political status) so both teams were declared ineligible for the competition.

⁴⁶ In another incident, Peru became involved in a dispute over a soccer game and withdrew its entire team from the Olympics.⁴⁷

The chauvinistic and biased attitude of the Germans was in evidence during the Games. Reporting on the German scoring system in an article entitled "36 Olympics Recalled as Gala, But Marked by Hand of Goebbels", Kenyon Kilbon stated:

...the German scoring system – devised by Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, had the victor as "the first white man to finish" – he termed negroes on the squad "black auxiliaries" and ineligible for the points. Using this system, he announced to the German people that the German squad had won the track and field title at the Olympics.⁴⁸

Finally, there was the infamous Jesse Owens incident where Owens, the black American track star, was reported to have been snubbed by Hitler. However, there was a consensus that Hitler was erroneously blamed for an incident which did not occur.⁴⁹ After

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁵ Fuoss, p. 172.

⁴⁶ Kieran and Daley, p. 155.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 158.

⁴⁸ Fuoss, p. 194.

⁴⁹ Killanin and Rodda, pp. 17–18; Richard D. Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971), p. 228; Fuoss, pp. 181–192; Henry, p. 238.

Hitler congratulated some of the opening day victors he was informed by the IOC President, Count Baillet-Latour, that he was only a guest of honor and he should not play favorites.⁵⁰ After the first day Hitler did not publicly congratulate anyone. Owens did not win his first medal until the second day of the competition.

It was obvious that the world situation was extremely unstable. There was an increasing degree of distrust between nations and they were quick to threaten or attack possible enemies. It is not surprising then, that the Berlin Olympics were also the most controversial and politically active to date.

1936 - 1948 Historical Review

The world's greatest fear was realized when World War II began in 1939. The end of the conflict did not appear until 8 May 1945, when Germany surrendered to the Allies. On 6 August, the first atomic bomb used in open warfare was dropped on Hiroshima and within the month, Japan surrendered and ended the war.

The balance of power had shifted dramatically after the war. Germany was initially divided into four spheres of control which were ruled by the USA, Britain, France and the USSR. But by July 1948, the USA, Britain and France had merged their German zones, pitting them against the Soviet-controlled East German zone. Japan was occupied by the Allies and the USA held prime control. Overall, among Allied powers, the USA and the USSR were the dominant forces. Eastern Europe fell under the influence of the Soviets and Western Europe was dominated by the USA.

The remainder of the world structure was not as forceful. Most of South Africa and South East Asia were under tenuous colonial rule. China was engaged in a civil war, and South America was subservient to the USA. The French were embroiled in a battle to control Vietnam, and Indonesia was gaining independence from the Netherlands. Britain granted independence to India which then split along religious lines to form India and Pakistan. India had a majority of Hindu residents and Pakistan was predominantly Moslem. The Palestine partition in the mid-east created the state of Israel and produced a perennial state of war between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries.

Competition intensified between the USSR and the USA. The Western Allies organized a currency reform in Germany without Soviet approval and the USSR

⁵⁰ Mandell, pp.228-229.

counteracted by attempting a blockade of Berlin in order to push the Western Allies out of the Soviet German zone. The Allies then countered the blockade with an airlift for the Western sectors of Berlin, and thereby spawned the establishment of both a West German State and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The League of Nations was replaced by the stronger NATO alliance. Finally, it was during this era that the Allies formed the United Nations (UN) in order to create a forum for controlling world peace.⁵¹

1948 St. Moritz and London

The Winter Olympics at St. Moritz were overshadowed by the American ice hockey dispute. Two separate federations, the AAU and the Amateur Hockey Association (AHA) of America, placed entries in the Games and the possibility of non-representation surfaced when the dispute could not be settled. The USOC felt that the AHA was composed of professionals and thus did not endorse them. Conversely, the IOC recognized the AHA since it had been endorsed by the International Ice Hockey Federation. The USOC then threatened to boycott the Games entirely when the Swiss committee gave their approval to the AHA. The Swiss next suggested they would withdraw as hosts if the USA did not enter, since this would cause them great financial losses. The commercial interests of the Games had emerged as an important factor to the host country.

The IOC decided to refuse to take a stance by banning both teams. The Swiss ignored the ruling and allowed the AHA team to compete in the Games. The controversy prevailed throughout the Winter Games and was not settled until May of 1951 when the IOC allowed both the USOC and the AHA to jointly choose future teams.⁵²

Although the hockey controversy erupted into a major dispute, it remained an isolated one, and the Games generally continued in a pleasant atmosphere. Following the precedent set by the 1920 Olympics, organizers and participants were simply grateful that peace had come and that the Games had been staged. After a 12 year absence, it was important for a regular schedule to return.

The London Summer celebrations sporadically displayed harmony and good will.⁵³ Germany and Japan were not issued invitations but the lesser European antagonists –

⁵¹ Espy, pp.21–22.

⁵² Fuoss, pp.200–214.

⁵³ Ibid. p.215.

Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Austria – were invited.

This move was not unexpected. The same actions were followed at the Belgium Games after the termination of the First World War.

It had, however, been three years since the war had ended and some of the harmony in the world had faded. Reflections of this were noted in the Summer Games. A controversy developed in London about its willingness to act as the host. Fuoss revealed that:

London sports writers asserted that the Olympic Games produced too many "international brawls" and should not be held for at least 25 years after the war so tempers would have a chance to cool.⁵⁴

Londoners also felt that the devastation they had suffered during the war did not allow them to provide adequate housing, transportation and food for the celebration. (Britain was actually bankrupt after the war.)

The USA offered to provide the food for the Olympics but the USSR attacked the offer saying it was an excuse for the USA. The USSR felt that if the USA had lost, it would have stated the physical prowess of the Europeans had been enhanced by the food it had supplied. This important incident reflected the start of a difficult era known as the cold war which developed between the USSR and the USA.⁵⁵

Another post-war problem surfaced during the Games. It was reported that the IOC was forced to rule Israel ineligible since it had not become an authorized member of the IOC.⁵⁶ This manoeuvre was implemented in order to avert a walk-out threat by the Arab bloc. Espy further explained that the Palestinian Olympic Committee had changed its name to the Olympic Committee of Israel.⁵⁷ This prompted an Arab withdrawal to protest recognition of the Jewish state. The IOC, by ruling Israel ineligible, had simply traded the participation of one group for the participation of many groups. Not only did this problem highlight the Arab-Israeli impasse, but it exhibited again that the IOC had the tremendous power, through recognition of a country's committee, of conferring political recognition.

The growing power of the IOC was reflected in another incident. Because the IOC failed to accede to USSR and East European requests for a seat on the politically

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.221.

⁵⁵ Espy, p.29.

⁵⁶ Kieran and Daley, p.187.

⁵⁷ Espy, p.29.

prestigious body, Rumania boycotted the Games.⁵⁸ This may be interpreted as a sign that the body was not *perceived* as being as transnationalistic as it had professed to be.

As earlier stated, the Games themselves were generally well-run. The only incident of note was when the 4x100 metre American squad was disqualified for a baton-passing error. However, the decision was reversed two days later when films showed the judges to be at fault.⁵⁹ The single incident which occurred after the Games was the refusal of some Hungarian and Czechoslovakian athletes to return home behind the Iron Curtain.⁶⁰ This was an act of disapproval for living under the Soviet regime.

The second London Games flashed indicators of future Olympic trends. The increased political status of the IOC was demonstrated by the Egyptian and Rumanian controversies. The Games also showed the decreasing tolerance of countries to compete in a "non-political" event and finally, the Games reflected the inception of the USSR-USA cold war. Politically, the Olympics had become extremely useful.

1948 - 1952 Historical Review

This era marked the height of the cold war between the USA and the USSR. Simply, the strained relationship which developed between them after World War II which made them each other's rival and brought them close to the precipice of a third World War, is known as the cold war. The roots of the bad feelings may possibly be traced to the American intervention in the Russian civil war.⁶¹

The USSR had dislodged the American nuclear monopoly when they successfully exploded an atomic bomb. China then offered an opportunity for the USA and the USSR to choose sides. A Communist victory on the China mainland forced the Nationalist forces to flee to the coastal island of Formosa (Taiwan). The Nationalists then set up a government in exile, and claimed sovereignty over all of China. The UN and the USA recognized the Nationalist government, but the Communists held actual control and were given lawful recognition by the USSR and its satellites.

The major powers again split over the Korean War of 1950-1953. The USA backed the South and fought against Soviet arms and advisors and Chinese forces in the

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.30.

⁵⁹ Killanin and Rodda, p.62.

⁶⁰ Kieran and Daley, p.217.

⁶¹ Sailendra Dhar, *International Relations and World Politics Since 1919* (India: Sri Gouranga Press Private Ltd., 1965), p.328.

North. Finally, the Berlin blockade failed, a separate West German state was formed, and the city of Berlin was split into East and West. At the same time, the NATO alliance was consolidated. All of these factors contributed to very icy relations between the USA and the USSR.⁶²

1952 Oslo and Helsinki

The winter events at Oslo, Norway were relatively problem-free, but there was still an example of the growing USA-USSR animosity. When the Canadian hockey team tied the USA in the final game of the tournament, the Moscow press charged collusion. It inferred that the Canadians had "thrown" the game in order to prevent Czechoslovakia from tying the USA for second spot.⁶³ The USSR had sent observers to the Games (as it had to London) and repeatedly let its presence be felt by making political statements. Finally, by the Helsinki Olympics in 1952, the USSR was ready to participate and, for the first time since 1912, it accepted the invitation to compete.

At these Olympics the IOC again demonstrated its difficulty in making changes to conform to the dynamic world structure. The IOC voted not to recognize the newly formed East Germany and thus, it did not participate in the Games. Communist China (the People's Republic of China – PRC) was allowed to compete and this caused Nationalist China (NC) to withdraw in indignation. The PRC arrived too late for its events and thus, China was not represented.⁶⁴ The power of the IOC to confer political recognition, first led by the IAF which acknowledged Finland in 1908, was gaining world affirmation.

The 1952 Games had been regarded as a major turning point due to the entry of the USSR.⁶⁵ The political actions which surrounded the Games were highly publicized and this focused greater attention on the political uses of the Olympic Games.

The first Soviet propaganda move affected the Olympic torch run. The USSR refused to allow the route to pass through Estonia, even though this would have saved thousands of miles, because it "had not been adequately Russianized and consequently was not open for world view."⁶⁶ The USSR then built its own Athletes' Village to accommodate itself and its satellites of Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania and

⁶² Espy, p.31.

⁶³ Kieran and Daley, p.224.

⁶⁴ Espy, pp.36-37.

⁶⁵ Graham and Ueberhorst, p.183.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Czechoslovakia. Tagged the "Eastern Camp" it was located on the far side of town and was enclosed with barbed wire.⁶⁷ This was totally contrary to the Olympic Ideal of a friendly atmosphere. What was most surprising however, was that the IOC allowed the village. The separation was blatantly a political one.

Generally, it is argued that the Soviets did not enter the Games until they were positive of an excellent placement.⁶⁸ Because of this view and the emergence of the USA-USSR cold war, the Olympics in Helsinki were overridden by an unofficial dual meet between the two countries. The domination of the previous Olympiad by the cold war was matched by the dominance of the rivalry between the two superpowers at Helsinki. It would only continue to grow.

1952 - 1956 Historical Review

The opposing trends of detente and containment were the primary factors during this Olympiad. The USA sought the containment of Communism. NATO was strengthened through German participation, and when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became sovereign, Allied occupation was terminated. The USSR loosened control on its satellites and made diplomatic overtures of friendship to Yugoslavia and Greece. The USSR also concluded a peace treaty with Austria. The Korean conflict had ended, economic conditions had brightened in Western Europe, and there was a lessening of the Soviet threat of increasing power.

In 1954 the Warsaw Treaty was signed by the eight states of Eastern Europe as a direct result of the German rearmament. In 1955 West Germany and the USSR exchanged ambassadors, and when East Germany became the German Democratic Republic (GDR) it too became a member of the Warsaw Pact.

However, 1956 was a year marked with turmoil and filled with nationalism. French North Africa was in a state of disarray and this led to Moroccan and Tunisian independence. Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in an attempt to gain economic independence. This move eventually led to the Suez crisis because it displayed the use of nationalizing to gain financial independence. Following the lead, Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and pandemonium broke. Israel then attacked Egypt while it was embroiled in the crisis and it took British, American, French and Soviet

⁶⁷ Killanin and Rodda, p.64.

⁶⁸ Kieran and Daley, p.223.

pressure to cease the hostilities.⁶⁹

During the same month a rebellion occurred in Hungary against Stalinist reforms. This prompted the USSR to move in and crush this outburst of disapproval. These incidents were to have a decided effect on the Olympics.

1956 Cortina d'Ampezzo and Melbourne

The previous Olympiad was generally one of reduced tension before the Suez and Hungarian crises. Since both occurred after the Cortina celebration, there was little external pressure on the Winter Games. The Winter Olympics had not reached the status of the Summer Games and, since their visibility was not as colossal, the infighting was not as fierce. The Melbourne Games were not as fortunate.

The Arab nations of Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq withdrew in protest against the Suez action. Spain and the Netherlands boycotted to protest the Soviet action in Hungary. The Swiss did the same, reconsidered, then could not arrange transportation and did not compete. These events were protests of the world's political events and demonstrated the strengthening nationalism within the National Olympic Committees (NOC) of the participating nations.

Government interference in both the IOC and the NOC's was becoming increasingly prevalent.⁷⁰ This was demonstrated when both of the German and both of the Chinese governments became involved in the IOC recognition process for the Games. The two Chinas were subsequently granted separate recognition. However, the PRC became insulted when the Australians ran up the NC flag in the Olympic Village and pulled out of the competition.⁷¹ Although the German problem seemed to parallel that of China, the IOC inconsistently voted to permit only a unified team to compete. The Germans accepted the decision, for they had come to politically tolerate each other by this time.⁷²

A problem with the equestrian event arose before the Games began. Strict Australian laws specified that all horses entering the country had to be quarantined for six months first in New Zealand or the United Kingdom. There was no solution found and

⁶⁹ Espy, pp.47-48.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.49.

⁷¹ Kieran and Daley, p.281.

⁷² Espy, pp.42-43.

the equestrian event was held in Stockholm in June.⁷³

Once the Games began, problems were few. The only incident of note occurred when the water polo match between Hungary and the USSR was halted after the game became very rough and one Hungarian player was badly gashed above the eye.⁷⁴

Generally, the relief of tension in the world was reflected during the Games. Even the closing ceremonies noted this. A token 500 athletes marched in a single cavalcade, with no regard to order or country.⁷⁵ This was a move which helped to *reduce* the political overtones of the ceremonies.

1956 - 1960 Historical Review

This time span was again marked by a lessening of tension between the USA and the USSR. However, the competition between the two countries and their respective blocs, East and West, remained intense. The two superpowers held opposing interests not only in Germany, but in China and Korea as well.

The USA was more deeply embedded in the Vietnam conflict with its bolstering of South Vietnam, while the PRC and the USSR aided North Vietnam. Africa had emerged with numerous independent states and became a hotbed of nationalism.⁷⁶ With the development of these new states, a struggle for influence occurred between the USA, the PRC and the USSR. The South African apartheid policy was also meeting with major opposition. This fight was led by the USSR because of its anti-colonial stance and its growing interest in black Africa. This era marked the birth of an emerging power bloc from the previously colonized countries and forced the non-aligned states to struggle to retain their autonomy in the face of stronger powers seeking to establish satellites.⁷⁷

1960 Squaw Valley and Rome

The Winter Olympics of 1960 were preceded by a political conflict between the host country and the PRC. Avery Brundage, who had become IOC President in 1952, had to warn the USA that if it did not allow all IOC-recognized countries to participate (including the PRC), the Games would be revoked from Squaw Valley. The IOC was worried that since the USA did not recognize the PRC, it would not admit the athletes

⁷³ Kieran and Daley, pp.271-279.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp.316-317.

⁷⁵ Espy, p.58.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.69.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp.68-76.

from the PRC to the Games. The USA obliged and announced that all Communist country athletes would be admitted, but the PRC became enraged at the IOC two-China stance and withdrew entirely from the IOC in 1958.

Communist bloc pressure then persuaded the IOC to instruct Taiwan to change its NOC name to exclude the word "China". Taiwan refused and it was subsequently excluded from the IOC. The American government's outcry was immense and Brundage solved the problem by allowing Taiwan to compete since the invitation had been issued before the decision was made.⁷⁸

In order to avoid problems in the Summer Games, the IOC agreed upon a precedent-setting decision and recognized NOC's under the name of the territory in which they operated. Taiwan was allowed to compete as Formosa and it did so at Rome, albeit under protest.

The Korean problem was also an important consideration for the IOC. The Koreans were instructed to compete as a joint team but North Korea refused and did not participate, although South Korea did. There were also grumblings from Germany but the two states once again competed as a unified team. A controversy did arise when the USA refused visas for fifteen East German officials and journalists. Even though there was a trend away from cold war issues and towards problems such as colonialism on the world scene, the Olympics were still marked by the cold war.⁷⁹ The IOC seemed slow to recognize and adapt to the dynamic world.

The problem of South Africa's racial discrimination policy (apartheid) was first brought to the IOC's attention in 1955, but for the 1960 Games the IOC was content to allow South African participation. The controversy would not die. The problem was based on the following government policy, as stated by South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster:

... no mixed sports between whites and non-whites will be practised locally, irrespective of the standard of proficiency of the participants. ... We do not apply that as a criterion because our policy has nothing to do with proficiency or lack of proficiency.⁸⁰

It is interesting to note that the Soviets introduced the apartheid question to the IOC at

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp.63-67.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.68.

⁸⁰ Richard Edward Lapchick, *The Politics of Race and International Sport*, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), p.3.

the same time that the USSR was fighting for influence in the emerging African states. Since there were no black African delegates on the IOC, the USSR used the opportunity as a more competitive nation to use its athletic strength as a political tool.⁸¹ Another political trend had emerged.

A disparate problem emerged at the Rome Olympics. In the words of Espy:

The Games had become big business, not only with regard to the costs but to the interests concerned. . . the Olympic movement was left open to attack from various external forces.⁸²

The concerns associated with this financial trend would become more evident at future Games.

A new era in decision making had emerged for the IOC. Rather than the minor disputes which had previously occurred during the Games, the IOC was faced with making major political decisions usually before the actual competition took place. Its resistance to accepting the changing world structure would simply lead members of the IOC to greater problems.

1960 - 1964 Historical Review

A primary threat to the major powers' status quo erupted during this period. The Sino-Soviet split took place and divided the Communist camp. This created three power blocs – the PRC, the USSR and the USA-Western Europe alliance – and each vied for the attentions of the non-aligned states.

There were two significant incidents between the USA and the USSR during this time. The U-2 incident in 1960 prompted Soviet President Krushchev to denounce American President Eisenhower for engaging in espionage. This led to an eventual breakdown in relations and, following the lack of effort by the USA to gain a peace treaty between East and West Germany, the erection of a wall in the city of Berlin.⁸³ The division of the Eastern sector of the city from the Western sector was completed by the USSR and the East Germans in August of 1961. At the same time the USA was forced to deal with French estrangement as President De Gaulle pushed for France's growing independence.

⁸¹ Espy, pp.70–71.

⁸² Ibid., p.73.

⁸³ Ibid., p.76.

1964 Innsbruck and Tokyo

The Innsbruck Games of 1964 were not marred by any political event. Again, because of the lower profile of the Winter Olympic Games, the temptation for major outcries was not as great.⁸⁴

The Summer Games had by this time become very politically useful for some of the participating countries. The IOC remained oblivious to this, and to the world's situation. It again insisted on a joint German team. This simply perpetrated the cold war conflict over Germany by allowing NATO to reaffirm its position in Berlin and its stance against East Germany. It may have been useful to allow two German teams and recognize the existing state of affairs. However, the refusal of visas to East German athletes to world championships in France and the USA only strengthened the IOC decision.⁸⁵

In 1963 the Indonesian Olympic Committee was dropped from the Olympic Movement. This was prompted by Indonesia's refusal to allow Israel and Taiwan to compete in the IOC-sanctioned Asian Games. The IOC then withdrew its approval of the event and ruled that athletes who had competed in the meet were ineligible for the Olympics. This caused the cancellation of the Asian Games.⁸⁶

President Sukarno of Indonesia then established and held the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO). Fifty nations competed in the unsanctioned GANEFO but, intelligently, most sent their lesser skilled athletes so that their official teams would not be disqualified for the Olympic Games. North Korea and Indonesia sent their top teams and the subsequent barring of those athletes from the Olympics caused them to withdraw their entire teams on the eve of the Olympics.⁸⁷ GANEFO would prove to be a major threat to the next Olympics but at these Games, the IOC was able to cover up the problem.

The South Africa (SA) apartheid issue could no longer be suppressed. It had been building during the previous Olympiad and it caused the IOC to take action at its meeting in Innsbruck in January of 1964. At this meeting the members of the IOC passed the following motion:

⁸⁴ Kieran and Daley, pp.366–374.

⁸⁵ Espy, pp.76–78.

⁸⁶ Kieran and Daley, pp.375–376.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.337.

... [due to the South African policy] of non-competition in sport and non-integration in the administration of sports in South Africa between whites and non-whites. . . the invitation to the South African team to compete in Tokyo is withdrawn.⁸⁸

The decision was the outcome of SA's continuing refusal to integrate its sports teams. The IOC had to react or face the alienation of all of Africa and its numerous sympathizers. The decision was a result of the emergence of the new African states on the world scene and the competitive interest in these areas by the power blocs and the industrialized world.⁸⁹ The intensity of the change had forced the IOC to take a stand.

Increasing problems of nationalism developed within the Games, as they had in the world. The split in the Communist camp, and the pending split between France and the Western camp along with the emerging states, forced the IOC members to contend with all three blocs.⁹⁰

1964 - 1968 Historical Review

This era marked the true emergence of black Africa onto the world scene. The attention focused on this area helped to relieve the pressure and tension on other troubled spots of the world, and there was a generally better atmosphere for the solution of prolonged conflicts. This was exemplified when the USSR recognized full sovereignty of East Germany. This facilitated a reduction of superpower entanglement in Germany, and left the problems mainly to the Germans.

The USSR and the USA were also expanding their interests in other parts of the world. The USSR was engaged in the Third World and the Sino-Soviet conflict, and successful military arrangements (NATO and Warsaw) had permitted a consolidation of positions and allowed for a progressive alteration of attitudes toward reunification.⁹¹ The PRC was also involved in a cultural revolution which shut it off from international contact.

There was however, another example of Soviet aggression. Just prior to the Games the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia in a similar fashion to the invasion of Hungary in 1956. This episode served as a reminder of the persistent East-West, Soviet-American estrangement.

⁸⁸ Lapchick, p.61.

⁸⁹ Espy, pp.85-88.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.93.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.107.

1968 Grenoble and Mexico

As had become the standard, the major Olympic incidents occurred even before the Games took place. Again, SA was a center of controversy. The IOC agreed to reinstate SA for the Mexico Games because SA had attempted to conform to the IOC rules. Most African countries then announced an immediate boycott of the Mexico Games and the USSR threatened to join in. By the end of the Winter Olympics 40 countries had announced plans to withdraw. Under this extremely heavy pressure the IOC reversed its decision.⁹²

The members of the IOC also had to deal with the German problem. Once again it delayed the inevitable by taking only one step and allowing two teams to compete (Germany and East Germany) but ruling that they had to have a common flag and anthem.

The third major problem was that of GANEFO. They had attracted a large contingent to the first celebration and it was important that the threat be nullified. However, the IOC was saved from taking any action against GANEFO when Cairo declined to host the event at the last moment and a substitute site could not be found in time. The IOC was probably quite relieved for GANEFO had posed a real threat to the Olympics, especially in the Third World. GANEFO's intense nationalism and superpower rivalry could have caused the IOC irreparable damage by not only luring away many Olympic Games participants, but by demonstrating the politics of international sport.

The Winter Games produced a major controversy. The International Skiing Federation (FIS) had allowed more leniency on the problem of amateurism and had overruled the IOC by allowing advertising in the skis. Since this problem surfaced just before the start of the Games it was too late for the IOC to take action against any of the skiers. The members of the IOC compromised the decision by disallowing any equipment to be shown in photographs. This action was not enough of a deterrent and the problem occurred in future Olympics.

The Mexico Games also had their share of incidents. Only days before the opening ceremonies, Mexican students rioted to protest the internal government policies and the excess money spent on the Games. The police were called in and the disturbance ended

⁹² Kieran and Daley, pp.418–419.

in a bloody shootout.⁹³

The invasion of Czechoslovakia did not have nearly as many repercussions in the Olympics as did the invasion of Hungary twelve years earlier. No boycotts occurred but, during the opening ceremonies, the Czech contingent received the largest ovation – even larger than that of the host Mexicans.⁹⁴ Because of the invasion, housing arrangements were switched so that the Czech team did not stay with the USSR or the East Germans.

Another incident occurred when two black American athletes followed up on their threat of protesting the treatment of the blacks in the USA. During the medal ceremony for the 200 metre run, Tommie Smith and John Carlos of the USA raised black gloved fists and bowed their heads during the national anthem. This political demonstration of black militancy caused the USOC to suspend the two from the American team and they were immediately sent home.

Finally, economic problems became more evident during the Summer event. The rival firms of Adidas and Puma (owned by feuding brothers) were accused of paying some Olympic athletes for using their products. This action was contrary to the Olympic code of amateurism but the full extent of the scandal was not revealed until much after the Games and thus, sanctions upon the athletes were not imposed.⁹⁵ It was evident that sport had become extremely profitable for some people. Overall, all the problems of the Games reaffirmed the enormous visibility of the Games and their use as a forum for the political realities of the world.⁹⁶ More motives for participating in the Olympics had become apparent.

1968 - 1972 Historical Review

Historically, this era was a major turning point in international relations. The PRC had successfully exploded its first nuclear bomb and claimed a position as a rival to the USA and USSR. The PRC had been admitted to the UN in 1971 (a sign of acceptance in the world) and it had fully emerged from its cultural revolution.

In the USA, involvement in Vietnam had become so unpopular that American President Johnson was forced to start peace negotiations and he declined to run for another term in office. Under the Nixon administration (immediately following Johnson)

⁹³ Espy, pp. 119–120.

⁹⁴ Kieran and Daley, p. 423.

⁹⁵ Espy, p. 120.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 122.

the USA entered a program of detente with the USSR and the PRC. A Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreement was reached between the Americans and the USSR in 1972, and trade relations had also improved.

The Mid-East was also experiencing a drastic change. Israel had successfully held off its Arab neighbours while seizing considerable territory. The USA grew closer to Israel while the USSR increased its commitment to the Arab nations. By 1971 the USA had relinquished the gold standard due not only to the growing economic power of the Mid-East (because of its oil) but also because of the changing world economic relationships. The prominence of the USA as a world power had decreased.⁹⁷

1972 Sapporo and Munich

Again, many decisions were made before the start of the Games. The first was to put the South African question to rest, seventeen years after it had first been discussed. At an IOC meeting in Amsterdam in 1970 the African committees presented charges against SA, mainly relating to discrimination. After Frank Braun, President of the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) made an attacking speech on the IOC, the vote was taken. SA was expelled from the Olympic Movement. It was the first time such action was taken against a member.

A boycott threat developed before the Games were to begin. The IOC had issued an invitation to Rhodesia to participate in the 1972 Olympics. Because of the minority white rule in Rhodesia, the countries of Guyana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan announced their withdrawal from the Games. American blacks joined in also. Faced with this drastic boycott, the IOC reversed its decision, withdrew the invitation to Rhodesia, and avoided the boycott.⁹⁸

The Winter Games were once more plagued by commercialism and professionalism. Shortly before the opening ceremonies Avery Brundage, on behalf of the IOC, barred skier Karl Schranz from the Games due to his alleged professionalism. Signs of nationalism did not surface at the Olympics over the event and there were no threats of a boycott from the Austrians or any other skiers. However, nationalism did emerge when Schranz returned home as 100 thousand people greeted him as a

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp.123–124.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp.128–130.

conquering hero.⁹⁹

The incidents were all greatly overshadowed by the tragedy of the Munich Games. In a grim reminder of the Mid-East problems, Arab terrorists broke into the guarded Athlete's Village, murdered two Israeli athletes and took nine others as hostages. In an ambush at the airport the terrorists assassinated all the hostages; a West German policeman was killed, five Arabs were slain and three were captured. A stunned and shocked world focused its attention on the Games. Demonstrations occurred at the UN and at embassies in Moscow. Three days after the massacre Israel retaliated in Syria and Lebanon, and Israel acknowledged the connection to the Munich tragedy. Espy felt the Munich massacre was a major catalyst of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.¹⁰⁰ For the first time an Olympic incident had provoked a war outside of the sporting arena.

1972 - 1976 Historical Review

There was a major change on the world scene during this era. Strained relations between the USSR and Egypt were improved and the USSR assumed military presence in Egypt. The USSR had directly supplied the Palestinians with arms. Egyptian and West German relations deteriorated, and an anti-Arab feeling swept through Western Europe. This could probably be traced back to the Munich tragedy.

In 1973 the Arab oil embargo began, and the American attitude toward Israel was reassessed. Arab oil money was altering the foreign policies of states toward the Mid-East. The Mid-East area had become a power center.

1972 Innsbruck and Montreal

Not only did the IOC fail to accept the world's political problems, but it also found itself unable to enforce its rules upon the host country if the problems perpetrated that country's ideology. This was exemplified by the problem of the PRC during the Montreal Games. While the IOC was procrastinating about the two-China problem (PRC and Taiwan) Canada, which had instituted a one-China policy in 1970, recognized the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China. Canada would allow the Taiwan contingent to compete only if they did not refer to themselves as representatives of China. Three days before the opening ceremonies, several Taiwan athletes were refused entry into Canada. The uproar in the USA became so great that it was suggested the Games be cancelled and/or

⁹⁹ Kieran and Daley, pp.455-456.

¹⁰⁰ Espy, pp.141-143.

the USA withdraw.

A compromise solution was offered to Taiwan to march behind a flag bearing the Olympic rings. The day before the Games began, Taiwan refused the solution and its athletes did not participate. (Taiwan officials did take part in the boxing events.) Overall, the Canadian government's policy did not bend for the Olympics. Its reputation was at stake. There had been a clamor for PRC participation over the preceeding years, but the IOC again demonstrated its ability for falling behind the times and thus, made itself vulnerable to political stress.¹⁰¹

The second major problem of the Games occurred over New Zealand which had been planning a rugby tour of SA. The problem appeared quickly and, two days before the Games began, fifteen African countries threatened to boycott. The IOC ignored the threats and refused to expel New Zealand. Thirty countries boycotted the Games. This episode served to prove that the Olympics provided "... a convenient forum for the exposition of a social and political cause, which went far beyond sport."¹⁰² Twenty-six other countries had sporting ties with South Africa, yet their participation was not challenged. New Zealand seemed to be an arbitrary choice for some countries to use to make a political statement.

Finances had also become an excessive problem in the Summer Games. The cost of the Montreal Olympics escalated from an initial estimate of 310 million dollars to an incurred deficit of 1.4 billion dollars. The Quebec provincial government had to financially rescue the Games and, in doing so, scaled down the exorbitant plans of the city of Montreal. The provincial government actually had to take over control of the facility construction from the city of Montreal because it had gone out of control. The Canadian federal government also became involved and the programs it instigated and supported brought the Games a total of 130 million dollars.¹⁰³

Commercialism was also evident in other aspects of the Olympics. An endless list of companies paid money to have their products referred to as the "official supplier to the 1976 Canadian Olympic Team" or the "official supplier to the 1976 Montreal

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁰³ Gerald Redmond, "Developments in Sport Since 1939", In Maxwell L. Howell and Reet A. Howell, eds., *History of Sport in Canada* (Champaign, Ill.: Stipes Publishing Company, 1981) pp.334-335.

Olympics". Companies from all over the world negotiated for exposure in the Olympic spotlight. Financial considerations had become an important part of the Games.

The 1976 Olympics exhibited several trends which were contrary to the Olympic ideals. The incident concerning the PRC demonstrated that the political beliefs of a host country could not be overruled by the IOC. It also showed the continued inability of the IOC to take a forceful stand on changing world conditions and to adapt accordingly. The New Zealand episode demonstrated the primary use of the Olympics for some of the participating countries – to voice their political ideologies to the rest of the world. The financial fiasco of the Montreal Games noted the need of the host country to offer more impressive venues than its predecessor. It was now of primary importance for the host to "outdo" the previous host. Finally, the excessive commercialism offered evidence that the Games had become "big business" to some individuals, companies and countries involved. Because of these and other trends, it seemed that the athlete would never again place first in the Olympics.

Summary

From a transnationalistic event to an explosive nationalistic encounter; this is how the Modern Olympic Games have evolved in their short history. What began as a challenge for the youth of the world has culminated into a battle for athletic superiority by the participating nations.

Both the Games and the world developed and grew during this era and, as they did so, it became impossible for one to change in isolation of the other. They were affected by the same problems, policies and actions. The major effect on both the world and the Games during this time was probably the increase in the nationalistic feelings of the world.

As individuals strongly identified with their nations, they were unable to dislodge their bond to nationalism in favor of transnationalism. When the Olympics were revived, their susceptibility to nationalism was high. The Olympic structure allowed nations to become the identifiable actors, rather than the individuals.

When the fight for world recognition and power increased, so did the fight for Olympic prestige. The members of the IOC were continually unable to cope with the

changes and the disagreements in ideology that challenged the Games. This in turn made the Games even more vulnerable to the power nations wishing to exploit them. Ultimately, the IOC lost partial control of the Games.

The Olympics have become another tool in the political arsenal of the competing nations. The participation of individuals has become necessary only to help achieve each nation's goals, and the individuals have been relegated to secondary importance. The top priority, as Brohm noted, has become the maintenance of the balance of forces between the great powers.

The value of the Games has become very precious for many of the participating nations. Numerous examples of boycotts and protests have been cited, but the Games have survived. The Games have become perhaps the most popular forum of international participation and recognition. They have immense visibility, for they are viewed by the entire world. They produce clear cut winners for specific countries, and they can offer instantaneous glory and recognition for both the individual and the nation. Because of these advantages, no boycott or protest has been strong enough to stop the growth of the Games.

Arguments between individuals and between nations concerning the future and the value of the Olympics will always be voiced. However, only when those individuals and nations accept the realities of the world structure will they be able to understand the realities of the Olympic Games.

III. THE CANADIAN BOYCOTT OF THE 1980 MOSCOW SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES

The Soviet Intervention In Afghanistan

Historical Background

The Moslem country of Afghanistan is a snow-swept, mountainous land with few natural resources. More than ninety-percent of its tribesmen are illiterate. These facts have never made Afghanistan a threat to world peace, or made it important to any single country. The tragedy of this country has been its geopolitical location in a world which is increasingly dependent upon fossil fuels, particularly oil, and Afghanistan's location has thus made it strategically important to both the USSR and the West. This land mass is placed between the USSR to the north, the oil-rich fields of the Persian Gulf (through Iran) to the west, and the nations of Pakistan and India, who in turn hold the key to the warm-water ports of the Arabian sea, to the east.

Although Afghanistan had fallen under Communist rule during the "April revolution" of 1978, when the USSR-backed regime of President Noor Mohammed Taraki came to power (deposing the Republican government of Mohammed Dauod), it was still officially considered to be a non-aligned nation outside the boundary of the Soviet orbit. This was insured by the *mujahidin*, Muslim militants and tribesmen, who had waged a long simmering and spreading rebellion to counter both the Kabul-centred authority, and the USSR.¹ These insurgents had effectively gained control over 22 of the country's 28 provinces.

Then, on 15 September 1979, Mafizullah Amin, a strict communist, seized power from Takari and became the nation's new president. Takari had just returned from Moscow where he had received a public blessing and embrace from USSR President Leonard Brezhnev.² Amin interpreted the meeting as excess Soviet dominance and seized the opportunity to depose and kill Takari during a coup.

Amin's presence concerned Moscow primarily because of the remarkably independent course he charted for Afghanistan. He rejected Soviet advice to seek a negotiated end to the war. He demanded, and received, a change of the USSR ambassadors in the capital city of Kabul. At one stage, he refused to go to Moscow for

¹ "How the Soviet Army Crushed Afghanistan", *Time*, 14 January 1980, p.23.

² John Nielson, "Russia's Afghan Coup", *Newsweek*, 7 January 1980, p.18.

talks.³ To compound the situation, the insurgents had received more covert assistance from China, Pakistan and other countries who did not want the USSR to "upset the balance of power in the region."⁴ The rebels' power had increased, and this was unacceptable to Moscow.

Amin was more of a nationalist than Moscow wanted. His army had been depleted by desertions and he had no hope of winning a military victory over the mujahidin. The increased strength of the Muslem insurgency had forced Moscow to propose that Soviet combat forces be brought in to put down the rebellion. Amin refused the offer.⁵

On 24 December 1979, the USSR made a final unsuccessful attempt to persuade Amin to co-operate. This failure appeared to leave the leaders of the USSR with only three options: 1) to allow a Moscow-leaning socialist state to dissolve into chaos and possibly pass into the hands of Muslem fanatics, 2) to send their own troops into battle against the rebels, risking world condemnation, or 3) to forcefully take control by improving the Kabul government's capacity to fight the war and appear to promote a political settlement.⁶ The USSR obviously decided on the third option, but felt it would only be successful if Amin was replaced. Little time was wasted in carrying out the decision. On the evening of Amin's final refusal of assistance, the USSR began an airlift of troops into Kabul to initiate what it termed "defensive aggression".⁷

The Invasion

In a lightning-quick invasion between 24-31 December 1979, Soviet aircraft and troops took control of Afghanistan. A coup of the three-month old Amin government was engineered, and the USSR installed its own man, Babrak Karmal, at the top. For the first time since World War II, the USSR had not only deployed ground troops outside of its sphere, but it had taken control of a country that had not been a member of its bloc. In doing so the USSR had violated a fundamental ground rule of East-West relations.⁸

More than two hundred An-22 and An-12 transports landed at Kabul airport between 24-27 December. They discharged 5,000 combat troops together with artillery

³ Ibid.

⁴ Strobe Talbott, "Who lost Afghanistan?", *Time*, 28 January 1980, p.23.

⁵ "Soviet Army", p.23.

⁶ *New York Times*, 29 December 1980, p.6.

⁷ "My Opinion of the Russians has Changed Most Drastically. . ." *Time*, 14 January 1980, p.13.

⁸ Ibid., p.11.

and armoured vehicles.⁹ The coup itself began on the afternoon of 27 December when officers of the Kabul garrison were invited to a USSR reception to honor "Afghan-Soviet military solidarity and friendship". By 6.30 p.m. the Soviets had left and locked the Afghans in the building, thus leaving the major elements of the Afghan army helpless.¹⁰

Soviet airborne troops were then able to storm the hideout of Amin, the Darulaman Palace. Amin, his younger brother and his nephew were captured and shot for "crimes against the people of the Afghan nation" according to Radio Kabul.¹¹ The only other serious military clash occurred outside of Radio Kabul. In both fights loyal Amin troops resisted, killing approximately 250 Soviet soldiers, but they were no match for the invaders.

By the morning of 28 December the coup had been completed. Soviet troops patrolled the streets of Kabul, and MiG fighters circled the major cities. Amin, whom the USSR press had treated with respect only a few days before, was described by *TASS* as an "agent of American imperialism" and a "butcher and usurper".¹² In his place the USSR had installed Karmal, a former Deputy Prime Minister (under the Takari regime) and leader of a pro-Soviet faction. He had been driven into exile in July of 1978 by the more independent Marxist rulers in Kabul and had been living under Soviet protection in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.¹³ Karmal had been seen as recently as October in the Soviet Embassy in Prague and he did not arrive in Kabul until three days after the coup.¹⁴ It seemed obvious that Karmal had been brought in by the USSR.

The second phase of the invasion, by Soviet ground forces, occurred between 29-31 December. One Soviet motorized rifle invasion, with at least 12,000 men, travelled from Kushka, in the USSR, to Kandahar. Another moved through the Salang pass to Bagram and Kabul. Other units moved east from Kabul toward the Khyber Pass and into Pakista province, a center of Muslem insurgence. By the end of December 1979, the USSR had two airborne divisions and two motorized infantry divisions in Afghanistan,

⁹ "Russia's Afghan Coup", p.18.

¹⁰ Arnaud deBorchgrave, "The 'New' Afghanistan", *Newsweek*, 21, January 1980, p.35.

¹¹ "Russia's Afghan Coup", p.19.

¹² *New York Times*, 28 December 1979, pp.A1;A3.

¹³ "Russia's Afghan Coup", p.22.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, 1 January 1980, pp.1;4.

with their total strength numbering 50,000 men.¹⁵

Explanations and Reactions

News of the invasion of Afghanistan brought immediate worldwide condemnation of the USSR, led by the USA and other Western nations. Although the invasion was not the only military intervention the USSR had ever been involved in, it was the first time since World War II that the USSR had used significant numbers of its own armed forces in a country outside the Warsaw Pact group. The question which arose was why had the USSR suddenly damaged USA–USSR relations and international order by such an undisguised invasion?

The incursion was intended to save our people from all the oppression, despotism, and calamities which were to be inflicted on them by [former President] Amin according to plots hatched by imperialist espionage networks. . . Like a blood-thirsty animal, the US is always colonizing and exploring [Third World] peoples.¹⁶

This was the explanation for the invasion offered by President Karmal. The USA was made out to be the threatening force.

Leonid Brezhnev also attempted to answer the question when he stated the USSR had simply responded to a call for help from Afghanistan, which had been under attack from another nation Brezhnev did not name.¹⁷ He later clarified his explanation when he said the Afghan rebellion had to be suppressed and the USSR was forced to suppress it. "To have acted otherwise would have meant leaving Afghanistan a prey to imperialism" said Brezhnev.¹⁸ The USSR ambassador to the USA, Fikryat Tabeyev, also offered a viewpoint. He stated that the Soviet troops had been sent to Kabul "to protect foreign embassies and maintain law and order" and to the countryside "to protect Soviet economic-aid projects".¹⁹ Ultimately though, the official position maintained by the USSR was that the military intervention was "a response to a request for military assistance against the provocations of external enemies". The USSR insisted that Afghanistan had requested "urgent political, moral and economic aid, including military aid" and the USSR had simply "met the request of the Afghan side".²⁰ The Brezhnev response was official.

¹⁵ "Soviet Army", p.21.

¹⁶ "The 'New' Afghanistan", p.34.

¹⁷ Ian Urquhart, "Death for detente?", *Maclean's*, 14 January 1980, p.27.

¹⁸ "In Moscow: Defiant Defense", *Time*, 28 January 1980, p.22.

¹⁹ "The 'New' Afghanistan", p.34.

²⁰ *New York Times*, 29 December 1979, p.6.

These explanations worsened the reactions of the Western world. This was most evident from American President Jimmy Carter. On 28 December 1979, Carter telexed a message to Brezhnev and called the invasion "gross interference" in the country's internal affairs and a "blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior".²¹ When responding to Brezhnev's explanation, Carter stated "the tone of his message. . . was completely inadequate and completely misleading. . . He is not telling the facts accurately. . .".²² The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Brezhnev's misleading explanation struck President Carter as a personal betrayal. It was suggested that his policies conveyed an impression of weakness and indecision, "If that was the Soviet impression, Carter was plainly determined to wipe it out".²³ Carter immediately warned that the invasion would be protested, but he was not specific. Said Carter:

it is imperative the leaders of the world make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot have taken this action to violate world peace. . . without paying severe political consequences.²⁴

By 4 January Carter gave an official response to the invasion during a television speech.

Giving his own Administration's explanation for the intervention, Carter stated:

Aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease. [The invasion was] a deliberate effort by a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people. . . [A] Soviet occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to their possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.²⁵

Allies of the USA responded with dismay but not with the same outrage. They may have felt that Carter's reactions were aimed at impressing not only the USSR, but the American voters as well. (It was an election year in the USA and Carter was campaigning for re-election). British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher informed Brezhnev that she was profoundly disturbed but did not announce any sanctions. French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announced a recall of his envoy in Kabul, but this was only to receive a clear account of the events.²⁶

The first official Canadian statement, delivered on 28 December, condemned the USSR for its role in the coup. In a prepared statement, the External Affairs Minister Flora MacDonald said:

²¹ "Death for detente?", p.27.

²² *New York Times*, 1 January 1980, p.4.

²³ "Carter Takes Charge", *Time*, 4 February 1980, p.13.

²⁴ "My Opinion of the Russians", p.10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ "Death for detente?", p.27.

The Canadian government cannot accept reasons cited by the Soviet Union for its military intervention in Afghanistan. It can find no evidence for the [Soviet] contention that Afghanistan has been the object of external aggression. . .²⁷

Although the Canadian government was not as agitated by the invasion as the American government, it was clear that Clark had not accepted Moscow's explanations either.

Reasons for Violating Detente

It was obvious why the USSR had invaded Afghanistan, but the question of why it had so boldly damaged USA–USSR relations still needed to be analyzed. It was perhaps the animosity that this caused, more than the invasion itself, that incited the outburst by the USA.

The height of warm relations between the USSR and the USA had occurred during the Moscow summit of May 1972. It was then the main character of detente, the "Basic Principles of Relations" between the USA and the USSR, was signed by Brezhnev and then USA President Richard Nixon. The agreement stated that the two superpowers:

will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations and that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.²⁸

However, even before Afghanistan, the USSR had demonstrated that even with detente, it was prepared to take hard action when an opportunity with a low risk presented itself. Examples of this occurred when the USSR sent 6,000 troops to Angola in 1975, and when it shipped thousands of men and large amounts of equipment to Ethiopia in 1978. Detente had survived these actions.

The USSR probably felt that Afghanistan was another low-risk opportunity. Five major points were in the USSR's favor. First, even though the USSR anticipated diplomatic friction with the USA, it probably believed there was almost no danger of Western military opposition to the move. Second, since 4 November, American policy makers had been preoccupied by the crisis of the fifty American hostages who were held by Iranians at the American embassy in Tehran. The actions of the spiritual leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had taken the major portion of the Carter Administration's time.

Third, the USSR probably felt that detente had not brought it the economic benefits it expected. The American congress had made trade liberalization and credits

²⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 29 December 1979, p.4.

²⁸ "My Opinion of the Russians", p.12.

conditional on the USSR's promise to relax emigration restrictions. Since the USSR had not relaxed its restrictions, it had not gained economically and thus, had nothing to forfeit.²⁹ Fourth, it was a presidential election year in the USA. Because the president's term was nearing its end, American foreign policy was at one of its weakest points. This left the USA in a vulnerable position and ultimately made 1980 (as an election year) a potentially dangerous time for world aggression.

Finally, the importance of the second Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II) being passed by the American Congress had decreased for the USSR. NATO had voted to produce and deploy an increased number of nuclear missiles, capable of striking the USSR, in Western Europe.³⁰ The USA had also voted to add to its defense budget and had awarded most-favored-nation trading status to China, not the USSR. Together, these three events decreased the theoretical importance of SALT II to the USSR so even if it was not passed because of the Afghan invasion, that would not be a major setback.³¹

These four major points probably combined to create an atmosphere where the USSR felt no particular need to be cautious. It likely felt it had little to lose, and much to gain.

The Development of the American Boycott

Although it is the focus of this chapter to describe and analyze the development of the Canadian boycott of the Moscow Olympics, it is necessary to first understand the development of the American boycott. The USA took the leadership role in the boycott and, even though all Western nations did not follow its example, the entire issue could be placed into perspective by understanding that it was a Moscow–Washington duel. Additionally, it is hypothesized that Canada boycotted mainly because of the pressure the USA put on it. Thus, it is important to outline the boycott from the American point of view.

The Boycott Suggestion

Contrary to popular belief, 1980 was not the first time the USA raised the possibility of boycotting the Moscow Olympics. Rather, the suggestion of an American

²⁹ Ibid., p.13.

³⁰ *New York Times*, 31 December 1979, p.3.

³¹ "My Opinion of the Russians", p.13.

boycott of the Moscow Olympics was first raised by President Carter during the spring of 1978. It was intended to show American disapproval of human rights violations in the USSR. A growing number of reports suggested the USSR had moved harshly against dissidents, including Alexander Ginsburg, Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Scharansky. The dissidents were not simply being expelled, but they were brought to trial and sentenced to lengthy terms in prison and labor camps. When the prominent, Western-backed dissidents were cleared of the charges through court proceedings, the boycott talk subsided.³²

It is interesting to note that in 1978 it was the news of the human rights violations that most provoked the USA's anger against the USSR. Strangely enough, the USA remained unprovoked by the news in April 1978 of a Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan and the seizure of power by a Marxist government. Although this marked the first time Afghanistan had fallen under communist rule, the USA had remained markedly unmoved.³³

Although other boycott threats were intermittently raised during the next two years, none were taken seriously until *after* the invasion of Afghanistan. On 30 December 1979, the boycott issue was reintroduced at an emergency NATO session in Brussels by the West German ambassador, Rolf Pauls. It was suggested as one of a number of possible retaliatory measures against the USSR to protest its Afghan invasion. Pauls was quoted as saying a boycott should be considered because "a boycott of the 1936 Olympics in Berlin may have forced Nazi Germany to take a different course."³⁴ There was no indication of strong support at the meeting but the chairman of the Norwegian NOC, Arne Mollen, warned that strong forces were already working for a boycott and that withdrawal thoughts should not be ruled out.³⁵

Initial American Threat

The USA's initial reaction to Paul's boycott suggestion was unenthusiastic. On 2 January, Carter Administration officials said the boycott was not a "priority matter" and

³² Phillip K. Shinnick, "Progressive Resistance to Nationalism and the 1980 Boycott of the Olympics", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, (Fall/Winter, 1982) p. 15.

³³ Christopher Booker, *The Games War: A Moscow Journal*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), pp.26-27.

³⁴ *New York Times*, 4 January 1980, p.A7.

³⁵ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 3 January 1980, p.43.

was not being actively considered.³⁶ Two days later, Carter reconsidered the statement and mentioned that a boycott of the Moscow Olympics by the USA was a possibility.

In a nationally televised speech on 4 January, he denounced the Soviet action in Afghanistan as an extremely serious threat to peace and announced five major retaliatory measures. They were: 1) cutting grain sales to the USSR by 17 million tons, 2) curtailing Soviet fishing privileges in American waters, 3) delaying openings of the USA and USSR consulate facilities, 4) stopping sales of high technology and 5) threatening a withdrawal from the Moscow Olympics.³⁷ Specifically, the first official American boycott threat stated:

Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.³⁸

This drew an immediate reaction from the United States Olympic Committee, supposedly the only group with the authority to withdraw USA athletes from Moscow. USOC President Robert Kane expressed shock at Carter's suggestion and added "I wonder if he understood all the implications . . . I don't favor the concept of an Olympic boycott". Added the USOC Executive Director Don Miller ". . . if the Olympic Games are to survive, they must be apolitical and remain in the private sector".³⁹

Immediate nationwide debate began on the possibility of a boycott. By 10 January, Carter had concluded that he did not have the power to enforce an American boycott, and that the most he could do would be to ask for a voluntary withdrawal.⁴⁰ However, the administration made frequent public statements to keep the idea of a boycott alive as a means of testing public sentiment.⁴¹ In the week following Carter's threat, both Secretary of State Vance and President Carter spoke frequently on the possibility of a boycott, and Vice-President Walter Mondale pushed for the Olympics to be moved to another venue.

³⁶ *New York Times*, 3 January 1980, p.1.

³⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 5 January 1980, pp.1-2.

³⁸ *New York Times*, 5 January 1980, p.6.

³⁹ *New York Times*, 6 January 1980, sec.5, pp.1;5.

⁴⁰ *Edmonton Journal*, 11 January 1980, p.A12.

⁴¹ *Edmonton Journal*, 12 January 1980, p.A3.

National Support

The Carter Administration began to receive the public support it had been seeking during the week of 14–19 January. Because it was an election year in the USA, it was certainly to Carter's advantage to follow the majority's opinion. Support was growing rapidly in favor of a boycott. In a poll conducted by the *San Francisco Chronicle*, for example, 75% of 16,393 people were in favor of a withdrawal.⁴² A public opinion survey conducted by *Time* magazine on a sample of 1,227 people showed 67% in favor of an Olympic boycott and only 24% opposed.⁴³

Influential sport writers were also supplying Carter with the coverage he required. In the 21 January 1980 edition of *Newsweek*, Pete Axthelm wrote:

Although it will be inconvenient for our athletes to seek new places in which to run or jump for glory, their problems tend to pale next to those people dying in various corners of Afghanistan.⁴⁴

Red Smith of the *New York Times* also agreed with the boycott stance. Wrote Smith:

It is unthinkable that in existing circumstances we could go play games with Ivan in Ivan's yard and participate in a great lawn party showing off Russian splendors to the world. We should pull out now . . . serving notice on the Russians that, no matter what happens in Afghanistan, their offense against international law will not be quickly forgotten.⁴⁵

The idea of a venue change appealed to Carter, and he decided to pursue this option leaving a boycott as a last alternative. Again public support swelled and government officials began to jump on the Olympic bandwagon as well. A *Newsweek* poll of 518 people showed 56% in favor of a boycott and 68% in favor of a site shift.⁴⁶ A *Washington Star* questionnaire indicated 86% of 2,666 respondents in favor of a boycott and 80% in favor of relocation.⁴⁷ On 18 January, Senator Edmund Muskie of Maryland suggested he would ask the Senate to press for a boycott unless the USSR withdrew its troops within 30 days.⁴⁸

NATO vote

The USA also received a major showing of world wide support for the condemnation of the USSR by the UN. On 14 January, the General Assembly voted 104

⁴² *New York Times*, 12 January 1980, pp.A1;A4.

⁴³ "In a Fiercely Hawkish Mood", *Time*, 11 February 1980, p.16.

⁴⁴ Pete Axthelm, "Boycott the Olympics", *Newsweek*, 21 January 1980, p.63.

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, 16 January 1980, p.A20

⁴⁶ Alan J. Mayer, "An Olympic Boycott?", *Newsweek*, 28 January 1980, pp.20–28.

⁴⁷ *New York Times*, 21 January 1980, pp.A1;A4.

⁴⁸ *Edmonton Journal*, 19 January, p.A2.

to 18 to "strongly deplore" the Afghan invasion and called for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan".⁴⁹ The size of the vote reflected the widespread dismay among Third World countries over the USSR's actions. Asia, Africa and Latin America, who habitually vote with the USSR, refused to do so. Not only did this mark a major turning point in the UN, but it also added highly credible and visible support for the American outrage.

Vance sets Mid-February Deadline

By the next day, Administration officials could no longer ignore the support. On 15 January, Cyrus Vance set a mid-February deadline for the USSR to leave Afghanistan or it would face the likelihood of a boycott by the USA. Vance stated that, in retrospect, American attendance at the 1936 Berlin Olympics had been a mistake and that had affected his thoughts about 1980 participation.⁵⁰ The exposure and prestige Hitler and the Third Reich gained in 1936 via the Olympics was interpreted by Vance to have an effect on the world events which followed. He did not want the same atmosphere created again.

Moscow Prepares

It is important to realize what the hosting of the Games in Moscow meant to the Soviet people. To the USSR, the Modern Olympic Games offered the opportunity to present what it believed to be glorious achievements of 62 years of Communist rule. Moscow had been scrubbed clean to present its best side⁵¹ As the first Communist country to host the Games, the USSR was determined to give a model performance. By its own estimates, the USSR spent \$375 million preparing for the Olympics, constructing ninety-nine arenas, dormitories and other buildings. (unofficial figures quoted the costs at closer to \$3 billion.⁵²).

There were also indications of a darker side of the Games for the Soviet people. On 11 September 1979, it was announced that a major campaign would begin against "hooliganism, crime, drunkenness and speculation." Dissidents were arrested but the USA, showing the inconsistencies of its foreign policy, did not react as it had in 1978 when a boycott was suggested. Ordinary citizens of the USSR were warned that unless their

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, 15 January, pp.A1;A8.

⁵⁰ *New York Times*, 16 January, p.A14.

⁵¹ William E. Schmidt, "The View From Moscow", *Newsweek*, 21 January 1980, p.25.

⁵² Hal Quinn, "To Play or not to Play", *Maclean's*, 4 February 1980, p.38.

behavior remained impeccable until the completion of the Games, their permit to remain in Moscow (a great privilege in the USSR) would be revoked.⁵³

There was to be no misunderstanding in suggesting the importance of the Games to Moscow. The Soviet text, *Book of the Party Activist*, clearly stated this when it noted:

The decision to give the honor of holding the Olympic Games in the capital of the world's first socialist state was convincing testimony of the general recognition of the historic importance and correctness of the foreign policy course of our country.⁵⁴

The USSR also responded to the boycott threat and accused Carter of "using sport as an instrument of blackmail". *Sovetski Sport* called the boycott a campaign conducted by anti-Soviet elements and predicted it would run out of steam.⁵⁵

USA Ultimatum

Carter responded to the public pressure. He had been slated to appear on a television interview show on 20 January and he grasped the national exposure period to issue an Olympic ultimatum. Reiterating the serious threat the USSR invasion of Afghanistan posed, Carter declared:

Neither I nor the American people would support the sending of an American team to Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan. I've sent a message today to the United States Olympic Committee spelling out my position – that unless the Soviets withdraw their troops within a month from Afghanistan, that the Olympic Games be moved from Moscow to an alternate site or multiple sites, postponed or cancelled.⁵⁶

Carter did not even mention the word boycott in his ultimatum. Responding to public opinion, he chose to pursue a site change. He also considered a postponement or a cancellation as possible alternatives to a boycott. Carter truly felt that moving the Olympics would have a global effect and that this action could possibly deter future aggression. This view was emphasized in the letter sent to USOC President Kane. Carter wrote that the USA had to "make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample upon an independent nation and at the same time do business as usual with the rest of the world."

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⁵³ Booker, p.28.

⁵⁴ *Edmonton Journal*, 21 February 1980, p.A4.

⁵⁵ *New York Times*, 13 January 1980, p.A6.

⁵⁶ *New York Times*, 21 January 1980, p.A1.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Ultimatum Reactions

International reactions to the Carter proposal were negative. IOC President Killanin called the decision hasty. It was a sign of the ever-growing animosity between the IOC and the Carter administration. Well before the ultimatum, Killanin had responded to the possibility of a venue shift when he stated:

We cannot change the venue and we cannot cancel the Games. The IOC is legally bound to hold the Games in Moscow [a contract was signed in 1974] and that is where they will be held. There is no question of their being changed.⁵⁸

Obviously, Carter had not agreed. And what had displeased Killanin even more was that the IOC was not consulted during Carter's decision-making process.⁵⁹

Although the IOC simply disagreed with the boycott proposal, the animosity created between the Carter Administration and the IOC was probably a major reason why the IOC refused to sympathize with Carter. The tough approach that Carter took, consistent with the USA's status as a "world force", backfired and simply made the IOC more determined to keep its original plans. Since both parties refused to compromise, this attitude only hardened during the following months.

The reaction of the USSR and its Eastern allies was hostile as well, but this only served to show Carter that a boycott could indeed be an effective weapon. In an obvious reference to both the Iranian crisis and the boycott threat, *Tass*, the official USSR press agency, stated:

... athletes and the sports movement are assigned, in his [Carter's] present adventure, the role of some kind of hostages, even though Carter of late has repeatedly denounced the use of hostages for the attainment of political ends.⁶⁰

Tass added that the President's objective was to disrupt detente and undermine peaceful co-operation among nations. The attention was precisely the Soviet reaction Carter had hoped for, since it demonstrated the importance they attached to the Games and this helped to solidify the boycott stance.

There was some dissension voiced from the American athletes. Sprinter Harvy Glance said "it would be heartbreaking for me and all the other athletes I know if we could not go. It would be the biggest disappointment of my life if the United States pulled

⁵⁸ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 17 January 1980, pp.1-2.

⁵⁹ *Edmonton Journal*, 21 January 1980, p.A3.

⁶⁰ *New York Times*, 22 January 1980, p.A9.

out."⁶¹ And Mark Belger, an 800m runner noted: "We are being exploited to the fullest extent. Exploitation is taking away the right to run in the Olympics after working with that objective in mind for years."⁶²

However, there were athletes who supported Carter's proposal. High jumper Dwight Stones suggested "I am totally in support of the President's suggestion. If the games go on without the US, they will be very shallow games. It would ruin the Russians' whole propaganda thing – that they and the East Germans can beat us."⁶³ Miler Craig Masback added: "As an athlete I am very frustrated and disappointed. But I am also well aware of what an important political tool the Olympic Games represent, not only to the Soviet Union, but to the entire Eastern bloc. Our boycotting the Games would be both valid and effective."⁶⁴

The USOC reacted with false hope. It noted that since Carter's ultimatum had requested a transfer, postponement, or cancellation, it felt the President had rejected the idea of a total boycott. The USOC was also relieved because the President had intended to go through proper channels (meaning the USOC) and that gave it time to try to work out a solution.⁶⁵

However, the most important response, from the public and the government, was extremely supportive the week following Carter's call. Several hundred telegrams were received at Olympic House in Colorado Springs with public sentiment vastly in support of a Games transfer or boycott.⁶⁶ On 23 January, the House Foreign Affairs Committee overwhelmingly approved a resolution to support Carter's proposal. The lone dissenter, Representative William F. Goodling from Pennsylvania, expressed the minority American opinion of overreaction. Explaining his negative vote, Goodling noted "I just don't know why we [congress] have to move this rapidly at this particular time. We are rushing into something without giving it much thought."⁶⁷

The next day the House of Representatives voted 386 to 12 to support Carter's

⁶¹ *Edmonton Journal*, 21 January 1980, p.A3.

⁶² "Olympics: To Go or Not to Go", *Time*, 28 January 1980, p. 16.

⁶³ *Edmonton Journal*, 21 January 1980, p.A3.

⁶⁴ "To Go or Not to Go", p. 16.

⁶⁵ *New York Times*, 21 January 1980, pp.A1;A4.

⁶⁶ *New York Time*, 25 January 1980, p.A10.

⁶⁷ *New York Times*, 24 January 1980, p.A6.

request for a transfer, cancellation or boycott of the Moscow Games.⁶⁸ Although reactions had been both positive and negative, Carter had received the positive support from the critical areas – the public, the government, and the athletes. It was impossible for Carter to retract his statement for he had committed the prestige of his presidency to the Olympic ultimatum.⁶⁹

Site Change Rejected

The only possible alternative to a boycott was a venue shift. Carter asked the USOC to formally propose this suggestion to the IOC at its meetings of the Winter Olympics which were being held, ironically, in Lake Placid, New York.

The sessions of the 89 member IOC formally opened on 9 February. The meeting was called to order by Lord Killanin who set the tone of the proceedings by stating that:

... solutions to the political problems of the world are not the responsibility of the sporting bodies such as the International Olympic Committee, but of the appropriate governmental organization.⁷⁰

It was clear the IOC did not intend to make any changes in its summer schedule.

This was ensured when the "strongarm" tactics, which were employed by the USA at Lake Placid, further outraged the IOC. First, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who had been invited as the American government representative, chose to deliver a political speech rather than a welcoming address.⁷¹ Vance urged the IOC to follow the condemnation of Moscow given by the UN General Assembly and pleaded for a site change. The strongly worded political speech shocked the IOC members.⁷² Its only accomplishment was to further strain the relations between the Carter administration and the IOC.⁷³

Second, another member of the White House staff attempted to employ pressure tactics. Deputy General Joseph Onek told members of the IOC that the Carter Administration would "destroy" the Olympic Movement if the committee rejected the American proposal to strip Moscow of the Games.⁷⁴ The IOC became angered at the attempted political pressure and the animosity increased.

⁶⁸ *New York Times*, 25 January 1980, pp.A1;A10.

⁶⁹ Lance Morrow, "The Boycott that Might Rescue the Games", *Time*, 11 February 1980, pp.47-48.

⁷⁰ *New York Times*, 10 February 1980, p.8.

⁷¹ *Edmonton Journal*, 11 February 1980, pp.A1;A3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.C3.

⁷³ *New York Times*, 11 February 1980, p.A3.

⁷⁴ *New York Times*, 10 February 1980, p.8.

On 12 February the IOC unanimously, and without a formal vote, rejected the American proposal and declared that the Games would be held as planned.⁷⁵ IOC Executive Director Monique Berlioux said it would be wrong to disqualify Moscow because it was involved in military operations. She reminded officials that the USA was involved in Vietnam in 1970 when the 1976 Winter Games were awarded to Denver; the USA was involved in Cambodia in 1974 when Lake Placid was given the Games, and the USA had landed marines in Lebanon in 1958 while it was preparing for the 1960 Squaw Valley Games.⁷⁶

It was clear that the IOC would not cancel, postpone, or change the game site and the only alternative Carter had left himself with was to boycott Moscow.

Formal Boycott Announced

On 20 February Administration officials announced there were 70,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The USSR had ignored the American deadline for troop removal, and left Carter with no alternative than to announce a certain boycott. In what was termed a "final and irrevocable decision" Carter announced that the USA should not send a team to Moscow, and that he expected the USOC to abide by the decision.⁷⁷ Carter's position was made perfectly clear when it was stated, "The United States will not participate in the Olympics in Moscow."⁷⁸

Presidential Pressures

In order to make the boycott decision formal, Carter had to have USOC approval of a withdrawal. The USOC had scheduled its boycott vote for 12 April, hoping that the world situation would change during those six weeks. It did not, and the pressure exerted by the Carter Administration increased. At the Lake Placid meetings, USOC President Kane had stated "Sure we're under [governmental] pressure . . . But that doesn't mean he's [Carter] shoving his ideas down our throat."⁷⁹ By 12 April it appeared Carter had done exactly that.

In the time between Carter's boycott statement (20 February) and the USOC vote (12 April) the administration had made it clear that extraordinary measures would be taken

⁷⁵ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 13 February 1980, p.1.

⁷⁶ Espy, 1981, p.193.

⁷⁷ *New York Times*, 21 February 1980, pp.A1;A12.

⁷⁸ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 21 February 1980, pp.1–2.

⁷⁹ *Edmonton Journal*, 9 April 1980, p.D12.

to ensure USOC compliance. White House staff contacted over 50 American corporations and asked them to withhold Olympic pledges until the USOC agreed to boycott. They attempted to buy votes from the USOC delegates by suggesting that governmental funds would be made available for their favorite sports – if they supported the boycott. Threats were made by White House council Lloyd Cutler that the USOC could lose its charter and its tax exemption status as a charitable donation group.⁸⁰ It was also suggested that, if a boycott was agreed upon, Carter would press for a bill to wipe out the USOC's 8 million dollar debt and request a grant of 16 million dollars for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.⁸¹

The White House also held a State Department press conference for major American newspapers which was designed to promote the administration's point of view. Leaders of American Sport Federations were invited to a strongly worded briefing in Washington, and a separate one was held for the athletes – addressed by Carter and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski – which stressed the importance and the inevitability of a boycott. Simply put, this pressure was described by the USOC's Miller as "blatant blackmail."⁸²

And just before the USOC meeting, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti unveiled one final weapon. He stated the President would prevent athletes from participating in Moscow under provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. If legal actions were necessary, Carter was prepared to take them. Said AAU President Robert Helmick of the measures, "We cannot allow the government to set a precedent here, because the precedent is pure coercion."⁸³ Water Polo team chairman Burt Shaw summed up the tactics by stating, "To get its way, the Administration was prepared to destroy amateur athletics."⁸⁴

The USOC Boycott Vote

The pressure exerted by the Carter administration made the outcome of the USOC vote inevitable. For good measure, Carter had sent Vice-President Mondale to address the committee just before the vote was to be taken. He delivered the

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ David M. Alpern "Carter's Gamesmanship", *Newsweek*, 21 April 1980, p.42.

⁸² *Edmonton Journal*, 9 April 1980, p.D12.

⁸³ Kenny Moore, "The Decision: No Go On Moscow", *Sports Illustrated*, 21 April 1980, p.31.

⁸⁴ "Carter's Gamesmanship", p.41.

Administration's case in unequivocal terms when he announced "History holds its breath, for what is at stake is no less than the future security of the civilized world."⁸⁵ The final vote of the USOC was 1,604 in favor of the boycott, 797 opposed, and 2 abstentions.

The coercion had worked, but not without a price. USOC member Robert Helmick described the tactics as "gross abuse of Presidential influence."⁸⁶ and T. E. Dillion of the National Rifle Association stated before the vote "I feel I have no choice but to support the President or be perceived as supporting the Russians. I *resent* that."⁸⁷ Even the Moscow newspaper *Pravda* used similar language to describe Carter's arm-twisting tactics when it described them as "brazen and cynical . . . financial blackmail."⁸⁸ Many Olympic athletes and officials were furious about the way the White House handled the entire boycott issue from the start. The pressure tactics only served to aggravate the situation and the bitterness, which could have been avoided through compromise, was only increased. But for Carter, it would have been much worse if he had lost.

The final task remaining was for the USA to seek support from its allies. Without backing from the important sporting countries, the American boycott would still be a failure.

The Development of the Canadian Boycott

Introduction

In describing and analyzing the Canadian decision to boycott the Moscow Olympics, it is necessary to do so in terms of the actions of the USA. Undoubtedly, the Carter Administration's response and reactions to the Afghan crisis, and its ensuing proposals and guidelines, did much to influence the Canadian government and the COA when they made their boycott decision. This action, coupled with direct American pressure on Canada, did much to ensure that Canada would support its geographical neighbour. The USA took the lead in the boycott issue and turned it into an East–West, or Moscow–Washington confrontation. This forced Canada to choose a side in the debate. Since Canada is a strong ally of the USA, with similar political and economic ideologies, it was extremely important for the USA to have its support.

⁸⁵ "No Go on Moscow", p.32.

⁸⁶ "Carter's Gamesmanship", p.42.

⁸⁷ "No Go on Moscow", p.32.

⁸⁸ "Carter's Gamesmanship", p.42.

The entire issue of support was complicated by a major political event which occurred during the height of the boycott debate. Prime Minister Joe Clark and his Conservative Party were ousted from office when the Liberals, under the leadership of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, were returned to power in a national election. The election took place on 18 February in the midst of the Afghan and Olympic debates. The governmental stance on the boycott situation was an election issue which left the athletes and the general public unsure of the final decision.

Initial Canadian Reactions

The Canadian government was in adjournment during the NATO session when the boycott proposal was first suggested. The first reaction came on 2 January from the COA when its IOC representative, James Worrall, stated the COA had not received any indication of Canada's position concerning the boycott suggestion. He said this was not unusual because:

... except for the Taiwan situation four years ago [Canada's one-China policy for the Montreal Olympics], the Government never seemed to put pressure on the COA. The Canadian government never has tried to lean on amateur sport. . .

⁸⁹

This pattern would not be followed when it came time for the COA to decide, but the pressure was never as forceful as the pressure by the government of the USA on the USOC.

The initial government reaction did not appear until two days later. At a January news conference, Prime Minister Joe Clark said that Canada was unlikely to withdraw from the Games because such action would have "no practical effect" on the Soviet position in Afghanistan.⁹⁰ On 6 January the External Affairs department solidified this position when it announced the Government was not considering any action that would affect the Games and that any action taken would have to be collective in order to be effective.⁹¹ Interestingly enough, this turned out to be the position Trudeau maintained during most of his decision-making process.

The position of the COA was announced early by its President Richard (Dick) Pound. During a Montreal interview on 7 January, Pound stated the COA would defy a Government decree to boycott the Games unless the athletes' safety was in doubt. He

⁸⁹ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 3 January 1980, p.43.

⁹⁰ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 8 January 1980, p.33.

⁹¹ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 7 January 1980, p.S7.

warned that Clark could not make a boycott decision because "the Association acts independently from the government."⁹² Clark decided to become more involved in the Afghan crisis when, following the lead of the USA, he announced Canadian sanctions against the USSR for their intervention. At a 11 January news conference Clark declared that Canada would: 1) restrict grain sales, 2) decrease high technology exports, 3) end the USSR's line of credit, 4) postpone, cancel and/or restrict foreign visits of ministers and officials, and of scientific and cultural exchanges, and 5) if the IOC suggested, consider to host the 1980 Summer Olympics in Montreal. He added that, barring a site change, a Canadian boycott was not being contemplated.⁹³ Thus, although Clark was not immediately receptive to joining the American boycott threat, he did offer the alternative response of a site change that Carter soon advocated. Clark's suggestion of a venue switch was his party's election platform for the month of January. He spoke with Mayor Jean Drapeau of Montreal about the feasibility of using the 1976 Olympic site. While it was possible, it did not initially seem to be plausible. Clark later struck a task force to study a number of alternate Canadian sites. They included Toronto, Hamilton and Windsor.⁹⁴ Clark had a definite preference for moving the Games, rather than boycotting them. At this point, he was in full agreement with Jimmy Carter.

Public Opinion Increases

The public quickly became involved in the Olympic debate. Since the federal election was only one month away, it was extremely important for Clark to act in agreement with the public. There was even support from an Olympic athlete at this early date. Cyclist Gord Singleton was not opposed to boycotting the Games. Said Singleton: "Because of the system they use to develop athletes, the communist countries dominate everything anyway. . . it's a joke. . . they should have their own Olympics and we should have ours."⁹⁵

The following excerpts from two letters printed in the *Toronto Globe and Mail* reflected the general feelings of the Canadian public during mid-January. Gregory W. Csullog of Hamilton expressed the view that:

⁹² *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 8 January 1980, p.33.

⁹³ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 12 January 1980, p.1.

⁹⁴ "To Play or Not to Play", p.38.

⁹⁵ *Edmonton Journal*, 12 January 1980, p.C6.

Getting on the bandwagon has never been my nature, but I cannot at this time ignore the Olympic Games furor. The pro-Olympic camp has voiced the opinion that the games are non-political and, therefore, should go ahead as planned. I strongly disagree.⁹⁶

Sentiment against the Olympic administrators, who were strongly opposed to governmental interference in the Games, was also increasing. In this regard, Peter G. Duncan of Don Mills wrote:

With great sadness, I note the pathetically naive views of the chairman of the Olympic Committees of many Western nations – especially those of the United States and Canada – concerning the 1980 Olympic Games . . . I wish the incredibly blind and well-heeled Olympic bigshots would climb off their ivory tower . . . we have had over 35 years of evidence of Soviet brutality, duplicity and complete disregard for human rights.⁹⁷

The public had taken interest in the Olympic debate, and it was difficult for the politicians to ignore it.

Canada Revokes Sport Agreement

The Conservative government took decisive action while public opinion was flourishing. It pulled out of a seven-year amateur sports exchange program with the USSR. On 18 January the Minister for Fitness and Amateur Sport, Steve Paproski, notified the Soviet Ambassador in Ottawa that Canada was withdrawing a protocol agreement under which 120 Canadian and Soviet amateur athletes were to participate in a 1980 exchange program.⁹⁸ By taking this step, Paproski had simply complied with one of the sanctions Clark had outlined during his 11 January news conference when the Prime Minister ordered exchanges to be cancelled, postponed or restricted. He had also just announced the first athletic sanction against the USSR.

At the same time, Paproski stressed that the last thing the Government wanted to do was endanger the Olympic Games. He stressed the revoking of the protocol was a separate protest. But James Worrall, Canada's IOC member, warned this withdrawal could be viewed by the USSR as a declining commitment towards Olympic participation, and as a step toward an eventual Canadian boycott.⁹⁹

Site Change Possibility

Clark disagreed. He still highly favored a site change and wanted a boycott as a last resort. Coincidentally, pressure to change the Olympic venue from Moscow had

⁹⁶ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 19 January 1980, p.7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 21 January 1980, p.5.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

increased in Canada as both the government and the COA backed the move. External Affairs Minister Flora MacDonald asked the COA to press for a site change at the Lake Placid IOC meetings scheduled for 8–12 February.¹⁰⁰ (Carter had requested the same of the USOC). On 17 January COA President Pound agreed to discuss a site change during the IOC meeting and suggested that a resolution to withdraw the Games from Moscow was a distinct possibility.

However, Lord Killanin again reiterated his response to a venue switch possibility when, in absolute terms, he stated it would be physically impossible to change the site. Since the IOC had a signed contract with Moscow that would cost millions to break, it was neither legal nor feasible.¹⁰¹ The IOC never wavered from this position.

The External Affairs Department refused to give in. It solicited support from other Western nations to move the Games. Japan, West Germany, Mexico, and several NATO nations and Commonwealth countries were approached by the Department.¹⁰² It seemed evident that Clark wanted to avoid a boycott if at all possible.

Response to the American Threat

On 20 January, President Carter announced the USA's intention to boycott Moscow if the USSR had not withdrawn in one month's time. The Canadian government was immediately supportive, but it was quoted as having problems with its Olympic Committee.¹⁰³ Pound was not supporting the government position because the COA disagreed, and probably because it was not forced to agree by the government. Clark had not employed enough pressure tactics on the COA like Carter had with the USOC. This allowed differences of opinion and a good amount of autonomy and credibility for the COA.

Evidence of this was found in Clark's and Pound's responses to Carter's plea. On 21 January Clark repeated his preference for having Canadians in the Olympics but added that he too endorsed a site change. Pound however, refused to endorse the Canadian or American stance. He said the COA would decide whether to participate when it received

¹⁰⁰ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 21 January 1980, p. 1.

¹⁰¹ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 17 January 1980, p. 37.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2.

¹⁰³ *New York Times*, 22 January 1980, pp. A1; A8.

its invitation from the International Organizing Committee.¹⁰⁴ Generally, the Canadian government supported the American government and the COA supported the IOC.

The Clark Boycott Decision

The possibility of a Canadian boycott dramatically increased in the next few days. After Carter defined his ultimatum as a boycott if a site transfer did not occur,¹⁰⁵ and sent a personal message to Clark urging his support, Clark shifted his stance behind that of the USA's President.¹⁰⁶ On 25 January Clark stated that he had not ruled out the sending of troops to the Persian Gulf in order to protect "vital" Canadian interests. He was determined to show the importance he attached to the area. Clark then stated for the first time that he was prepared to seriously consider a boycott, but for the time he was still focusing his energies on a site change.¹⁰⁷ He also indicated that, if necessary, the government could withdraw financial support from the athletes and exert other "unspecified pressures" to keep them in Canada.¹⁰⁸ For the first time, Clark hinted that the government could take steps to pressure the COA to agree with it.

Clark was adamant about supporting the USA. In doing so, he won some of his best campaign crowd reactions by springing to Carter's side. Said Clark: "This is no time for a Canadian leader to be confused who our real friends are."¹⁰⁹

A change had occurred in Clark's platform. When the boycott calls had started several weeks earlier, Clark had been opposed. As Canadian support and American government pressure for a boycott grew, Clark switched his stance to favor a boycott. With the federal election only a few weeks away, he had little choice but to comply.

Two days later, Clark completed his change in positions. On 27 January, he announced that Canada, following the example of the USA, would boycott the Games if the USSR did not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by 20 February.¹¹⁰ However, Canadians could still not be certain of Canada's non-participation because the deadline fell two days after the 18 February Canadian federal election. If there was a leadership change at this time, Clark's decision would be rendered powerless. As Bruce Kidd, a

¹⁰⁴ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 22 January 1980, pp.1-2.

¹⁰⁵ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 23 January 1980, p.12.

¹⁰⁶ *New York Times*, 22 January 1980, p.A1.

¹⁰⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 26 January 1980, pp.1;3.

¹⁰⁸ *Edmonton Journal*, 26 January 1980, p.A3.

¹⁰⁹ John Hay, "To Boycott or Not to Boycott . . .", *Maclean's*, 3 March 1980, p.32.

¹¹⁰ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 28 January 1980, p.9.

professor of physical education at the University of Toronto aptly predicted: "by that time [20 February] Joe Clark will no longer be Prime Minister, so his words won't have the force of government behind them."¹¹¹

This was complicated by the stance taken by the Opposition leader, Trudeau. Initially, the Liberal party had criticized the use of the Olympics for political purposes. However, after chastizing Clark for making a major decision during an election campaign without consulting other leaders, Trudeau shifted his position to say that a boycott would be ineffective in isolation, but that he would support one if other Western and Third World countries joined in. Trudeau stated:

Canada's response . . . to the Soviet Union should be calculated to impress the Kremlin, not to win votes in a Canadian election. . . Every Canadian knows that our boycott of the Olympics will not by itself move one soldier or one truck out of Afghanistan.¹¹²

Trudeau deferred any decision until the election was over, and he left himself open to deciding on either participation or a boycott. It is of interest to note that earlier Trudeau had complained that Clark, as prime minister, had failed to support Washington in other conflicts.¹¹³ Now he complained when Clark had rushed to support the USA.

Boycott Reactions

The immediate reaction of some Canadian athletes was not favorable. Said diver, Janet Nutter (who had come out of retirement to train for Moscow):

What's going to prevent them from going back into Afghanistan the day after the Games are over? Obviously the boycott is not a long-term means of dealing with the crisis, and if it isn't, why are we using it?¹¹⁴

High jumper Greg Joy had harsher words, deciding to blame Clark rather than disagree with the boycott. Joy noted:

I predicted the move a week ago when President Carter started getting huge public support for his boycott idea. Isn't it obvious Clark decided this was a good political idea for him?¹¹⁵

Public support indicated agreement with the Clark decision, and noted that the boycott would cause damage to the USSR. F. Sibley of Mississauga, in a letter to the editor, noted:

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 30 January 1980, p. 1.

¹¹³ "To Boycott or Not to Boycott. . .", p. 33.

¹¹⁴ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 28 January 1980, pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

To attend the Games in the face of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan would be tantamount to endorsement of their actions. A boycott, on the other hand, will do enormous damage to their international propaganda machine. The Russian people have been keenly looking forward to the huge sports spectacle. . . How will their masters explain the snub?¹¹⁶

However, Bruce Kidd, a strong boycott opposer, offered an alternative point of view. In explaining his disagreement with the comparison to the 1936 Olympics, Kidd suggested:

There is a significant difference between the present boycott campaign and that directed against the 1936 Games in Germany. Today's boycott has been initiated by politicians who have rarely taken an interest in sport. The pre-1936 campaign was initiated by athletes and sports officials, in a response to Nazi atrocities in *sport*: the brutal suppression of all non-Nazi sports organizations and the murder and arrest of athletes and coaches who dared to resist.¹¹⁷

In comparison to the public support in the USA, it seemed that Canadians were not as enthusiastic about supporting their government, probably because they were unsure as to who would be leading it.

Additionally, the disagreement between the government and the COA continued. Clark had met members of the COA before he announced his decision (Carter had simply mailed the USOC a letter) and had asked them to convey the government's position at the IOC Lake Placid meetings. He stressed that not only should Canada stand behind the USA in opposing the USSR's disrespect for human rights, but that as a strong ally of the USA, it should be very clear in its position of support.

COA President Pound did not immediately agree with the effectiveness of the boycott and he still refused to support the government position. After the meeting with Clark, Pound said it was too early to say whether the association would recommend a boycott at the IOC meeting.¹¹⁸ Pound remained adamant about the autonomy of the association and since Clark had yet to drastically exert pressure against the COA, it refused to support the government position. However, by dismissing pressure tactics, Clark was able to maintain a positive relationship between the COA and the government.

By the end of January, the final decision on a Canadian boycott was still very much in doubt. If Clark won the election Canada would boycott the Moscow Olympics, pending the approval of the COA. If Trudeau won, it was not known what would occur.

¹¹⁶ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 1 February 1980, p.11.

¹¹⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 26 January 1980, p.7.

¹¹⁸ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 28 January 1980, p.9.

Site Change Rejected

Clark's number one priority was still a site change for the Olympics. By the end of January the government had begun a study into the possibility of Montreal acting as a host and Clark had decided to present a brief of the findings at the IOC Lake Placid meetings. Clark also stated the federal government was willing to cover part of the costs of holding some of the Olympics in Montreal.¹¹⁹

However, the possibility of a venue shift had been poorly accepted by sport administrators. The IOC was still adamant about keeping the Games in Moscow. Only two days before the Lake Placid meetings opened Lord Killanin stated that, although it would be wrong to prejudge the decisions of the committee, he was certain that Moscow would host the Games.¹²⁰

Another sport body also vehemently rejected moving the site. The Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC), at a 5 February meeting, passed a resolution urging the IOC to reject a site change and to resist any outside pressures, whether of a political, religious or economic nature. The 141 nation association (to which neither Canada nor the USA belonged) also voted to present the resolution at Lake Placid.¹²¹

Proposals were submitted by USOC President Kane (to transfer the Games) by the Canadian Minister of Fitness and Amateur Sport Paproski (to stage alternate "Free World Games" in the Montreal-Windsor area), and by the ANOC (to continue as planned). the IOC declined to make any immediate decision, waiting instead to discuss the matters.¹²²

By 12 February the IOC had made the decision that the Games would be held as planned. It had ignored all suggestions, and had refused to succumb to the political pressures put upon it. In reading the statement of approval for the Moscow site, which was partially prepared by the Canadian member James Worrall, Killanin noted the IOC could not solve the political problems of the world, and that the staging of the Games in Moscow was not an endorsement of Soviet foreign policy.¹²³ Ironically, that same IOC had ordered the Taiwanese athletes ineligible to compete at Lake Placid because they had

¹¹⁹ *Edmonton Journal*, 11 February 1980, p.A3.

¹²⁰ *New York Times*, 7 February 1980, p.B7.

¹²¹ *New York Times*, 6 February 1980, p.A10.

¹²² *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 9 February 1980, p.16.

¹²³ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 13 February 1980, p.1.

insisted on using the same flag and anthem as the People's Republic of China.¹²⁴

Both James Worrall and COA President Pound supported the decision of the IOC, even though they recognized that this placed them in direct conflict with the stance of the Canadian government. With the federal election less than a week away, it was understandable that these sport administrators did not feel compelled to support their government.

The Federal Election

The only real effect the change of government had on Canada's boycott stance was to delay the inevitable decision and cause doubt to linger for a greater period of time.

Joe Clark supported a boycott. He had joined Jimmy Carter in setting a 20 February deadline for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to avoid a Canadian boycott. Conversely, Trudeau was in no hurry to make a decision. He charged Clark with electioneering for setting the deadline and suggested it would be better to have the Western allies join in a concerted protest effort.¹²⁵

Clark remained adamant about his position. After the IOC vote in Lake Placid where members agreed to proceed with the Games, Clark announced his dissatisfaction with the outcome. He added that a Conservative government would withhold financial support for the COA if it persisted on following the IOC decision. Clark stated he would ask Canadian athletes to boycott Moscow if Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan on 20 February.¹²⁶

Clark was not allowed the opportunity to honor his threat. On 18 February Pierre Trudeau and the Liberals won a majority government and Clark was relegated to the position of Leader of the Opposition. The final count gave the Liberals 146 seats, the Progressive Conservatives 103, and the New Democratic Party 32. On 20 February Clark held his last cabinet meeting. Instead of considering a boycott of the Olympics, as had been originally planned, the Cabinet instead discussed the transition of power and the failures of the election campaign.¹²⁷ As had been accurately predicted, by 20 February, Clark *did not* have the governmental power to carry out his proposal.

¹²⁴ Hal Quinn, "Look Back In Anguish", *Maclean's*, 25 February 1980, p.38.

¹²⁵ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 9 February 1980, p.17.

¹²⁶ *Edmonton Journal*, 14 February 1980, p.A10.

¹²⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 20 February 1980, pp.1-2.

The Canadian boycott position was put very much in doubt. During the election campaign Trudeau had been much less supportive of the USA than had Clark and he indicated stronger independence from the USA to be his party's position. Trudeau had continually modified his stance, reacting to the political climate, until he finally gave qualified support to a Canadian boycott on 29 January.¹²⁸ Trudeau maintained the position, right up to election day, that only an international boycott would be worthwhile.

The initial two weeks after the election were filled with the transition of power and the Cabinet selection. A decision on the Olympics was not deemed a major priority. However, even at this time Dick Pound felt he was fighting a losing battle when he stated "no Western nation, including Canada, can withstand mounting US pressure to support the boycott."¹²⁹ Because Canada now had a long term government, it was only logical for the USA to begin to apply pressure for boycott support.

Trudeau Delays Decision

The first boycott information from the Liberal government was received on 4 March. A spokesman for the External Affairs Department said any decision would be postponed until the end of May because the deadline for accepting the invitation to Moscow was not until 24 May. The newly appointed minister for the department, Mark MacGuigan (who had replaced Flora MacDonald), explained a specific date could not be given because he had yet to discuss the matter with Trudeau. He reiterated that Canada planned to see how support for a boycott evolved before committing itself one way or another.¹³⁰ The news was greeted with optimism from Moscow. The deputy chief of the Soviet Olympic press department, Herman Vladimirov, was quoted as saying, "I heard that Killanin has received some positive news from Canada in the last 10 days."¹³¹ Evidently some Muscovites wished the Canadians to attend.

By 19 March, after consultation with Trudeau, MacGuigan announced an earlier date for a boycott decision. While reiterating that Canada was in contact with other countries about boycotting, he suggested the government would reach a decision by the latter part of April. MacGuigan indicated that the USA had not done enough consultation

¹²⁸ *Edmonton Journal*, 30 January 1980, p.A18.

¹²⁹ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 22 February 1980, p.1.

¹³⁰ *Edmonton Journal*, 5 March 1980, p.A14.

¹³¹ *Edmonton Journal*, 13 March 1980, p.A2.

prior to its decision and that Canada was attempting to make up for that lapse.¹³²

COA Votes to Attend

Because of governmental indecisiveness and lack of pressure, the COA acted on its own and demonstrated its autonomy from the government. On 26 March Pound explained the COA could act independently because it had enough money to send a team to Moscow without federal assistance. Under an agreement with the COA, a group called the Olympic Trust (OT) was required to raise and administer all the financial requirements of the COA. The group, made up of influential Canadian businessmen, had raised over 90% of its objective. Willy Halder, President of the Olympic Trust Fund, said that by 27 March the Trust had accumulated enough money to cover the costs of sending a Canadian team to Moscow. The budget for the Games was quoted at 1.67 million dollars and the Olympic Trust had already raised 3 million dollars.¹³³ Any threat of the government withholding financial assistance seemed to be void.

The COA reacted to this revelation quickly. Only four days later, on 30 March, the board of directors of the COA passed a resolution affirming their intention to accept an invitation to participate in the Games. The resolution, said the Association,

... rejects in principle the proposition that the burden of Canada's response to the present international situation be borne primarily by Canadian Olympic athletes and that, in the absence of a much broader Canadian government response to the international situation, the COA confirms its resolve to accept the invitation to participate in the 1980 Olympic Games, within the time limit provided in the Olympic charter.¹³⁴

This was not delivered as an ultimatum. The COA expressed its wishes to attend but had not yet formally accepted the invitation. Pound explained that out of courtesy to the government the COA would not respond until it had met with Trudeau, MacGuigan, and/or Sport Minister Gerald Regan. The COA further added that at its annual meeting on 26 April a workshop would be held, involving two athletes from each of the 27 summer and winter sports, allowing a forum for athletes to view their boycott feelings.¹³⁵

Reflecting the positive relationship between the COA and the government, the resolution was couched in diplomatic language.¹³⁶ The COA probably made a decision for two reasons. First, it may have wanted to put pressure on the government to make an

¹³² *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March, p.A2.

¹³³ *Edmonton Journal*, 28 March 1980, p.A8.

¹³⁴ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 31 March 1980, p.1.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Edmonton Journal*, 31 March 1980, p.A9.

immediate decision. Second, the COA was scheduled to meet government officials on 2 April and probably felt its case would appear much stronger if a sound mandate was presented.

The COA decision was calmly received by the government. Sport Minister Gerald Regan, who had replaced Steve Paproski, stated:

... the Olympic Association is totally within its rights to make the decision to send a team to Moscow. . . If the Government does decide to participate in the boycott, all we can do is ask the COA to abide by our decision. . . and I am confident that, if that should happen, the COA would seriously reconsider its position.¹³⁷

At least one other Canadian citizen felt the government was procrastinating in reaching a decision. Kitson Vincent took out a full page advertisement in the *Globe and Mail* to respond to remarks made by American Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd. Expressing the feelings of the USA on Canada's indecisiveness about the boycott, Byrd had earlier stated:

It almost makes me vomit to think of the humming and hawing, the vacillating, the waiting and seeing. Its just beyond me why our allies cannot see the principle involved here.

Replied Kitson Vincent:

... I want to assure you that many ordinary Canadians are outraged at the stance of the Trudeau government. I am one of them, and I will not let the government speak for me on the profound moral issues that underlie the Olympic boycott. . . I want you to know that across the northern half of this continent many of us solidly support a boycott.¹³⁸

The government's stance was that it was simply trying to gather enough support to make a boycott worthwhile.

Interestingly, the COA announcement came only one week after the British Olympic Association rejected Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's request for a boycott and voted to accept Moscow's invitation. World support for the boycott had suggested a shift in its position toward participation, and the COA were quick to take advantage of this.

Olympic Trust Pressure

Although the government reaction was patronizing, the OT reaction was an outright threat. On 31 March Canada's Olympic chef de mission, Dennis Whitaker, vowed to personally boycott the Games and warned that as a last resort, the OT Fund could

¹³⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 1 April 1980, p.49.

¹³⁸ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 12 April 1980, p.3.

refuse to release its money to the team. Whitaker, who had cast the lone dissenting vote at the COA meeting had presented a motion at that meeting unanimously endorsed by the Trust's executive (of which he was a Director) requesting the COA to join the USA in boycotting Moscow. The motion was defeated 25–5.¹³⁹

The COA had erred in voting against the OT motion. Since the OT controlled the COA's pursestrings it held a great deal of power. The OT, comprised of influential Canadian businessmen, many of whom work for American-based corporations, reported that most corporate donors were opposed to having contributions finance Moscow participation.¹⁴⁰ It may have been that the American companies had put some pressure on the OT to withhold its 1.7 million dollars contribution.

Pound interpreted the OT announcement casually. He did not expect the OT to withhold funds and thought the resolution was more a warning that a decision to compete in the Games would severely hamper private fund raising. Pound added that a move to withhold funds was "a lever only in theory."¹⁴¹

The OT was serious. The next day, 1 April, the executive committee of the OT sent Trudeau, MacGuigan and Regan telegrams requesting a meeting to discuss the boycott issue. The OT's rationale for requesting a meeting was that if it could convince the government to support a boycott, it could avoid open warfare with the COA. Trust president Halder explained this reasoning, saying:

if the Canadian Government said you don't go, and the general public said you don't go, it would be very difficult for us to spend these funds on sending an Olympic team to Moscow. . . . If the Government and the citizens of Canada said don't go. . . . I feel the COA would comply under those conditions.¹⁴²

Geoff Elliott, then Executive Director of the Canadian Track and Field Association, emphasized the powers of the OT. Said Elliott:

. . . the political pressures that the Olympic Trust can put on the Government are very high. . . . the Olympic Trust . . . [has] a pretty strong lobby in Ottawa and hold some very influential controls over some of the political decisions that are made, particularly related to sport. . . .¹⁴³

However, at least two citizens became incensed at the tactics used by the OT to get the COA to comply with its boycott wish. Jean and Peter Martin of Agincourt Ontario,

¹³⁹ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 1 April 1980, p.49.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 2 April 1980, p.33.

¹⁴³ Geoff Elliot, personal interview with author, 22 July 1982, Edmonton, Alberta.

in a letter to the editor, stated:

We are getting irritated by the campaigns of wealthy individuals and businesses, mainly US-based, who are trying to prevent our young athletes going to the Olympics. Its about time we stopped expecting our young people to pay the price for old men's follies. . .¹⁴⁴

The Government and COA React

The OT reaction, along with governmental pressures, worked to get the COA to retreat from its Moscow stance. After the 2 April meeting with Mark MacGuigan and Gerald Regan, Dick Pound and James Worrall said they had told the two cabinet ministers to make a decision on whether the athletes should compete.¹⁴⁵ Pound said that *the COA would then reconsider its position and do whatever the Government told it to do with regard to the boycott*.¹⁴⁶ Regan and MacGuigan replied that the government was still trying to determine if there was enough world-wide support to make a boycott an effective protest, and that a decision would be made before the end of the month.

Even though world support for a boycott had decreased, evidence of public and government support in Canada had increased. A pressure group called the National Citizens Coalition reported that more than 2,600 Canadians mailed in coupons from its newspaper advertisements regarding the Olympic situation. It noted that more than 95% of the responses were in favor of a Canadian boycott.¹⁴⁷ Letters to the editor were also favoring a boycott. J. K. Stribiny of Edmonton wrote:

[the IOC refusal to transfer the Games] does not leave us any alternative but to boycott the Games, organized by a government which is currently engaged. . . in a terrible genocide of a small but courageous nation.¹⁴⁸

Even Premier William Davis of Ontario expressed his support for a boycott when he urged Ontarians to show "who your friends are and the principles on which you stand."¹⁴⁹

The events of this period seemed to be the turning point for the boycott decision. The OT had the legal right to refuse the COA its 1.7 million dollar pledge. This probably left the COA feeling it had no choice but to comply to the increased public and governmental pressure. The USA began to pressure Canada for its support. Because the OT, the USA and the Canadian public wanted a boycott, and because the COA was no

¹⁴⁴ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 23 April 1980, p.6.

¹⁴⁵ *Edmonton Journal*, 2 April 1980, p.A15.

¹⁴⁶ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 3 April 1980, p.51.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ *Edmonton Journal*, 9 April 1980, p.5.

¹⁴⁹ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 14 April 1980, p.4.

longer a threatening or potentially embarrassing force, it seemed inevitable that the government would vote to boycott the Olympics.

On 12 April the USOC had voted to boycott the Games. After this ruling, which made the USA boycott official, it was expected that Canada would bow to pressure from the American presidency and support a boycott. Canadian Olympic officials held little hope that the government could resist the American pressure even if Ottawa wanted to send a team to Moscow. It had become a totally political decision, and Carter had forced Canada to choose sides. Wally Halder of the OT said the chances of Canada going to Moscow were diminishing every day, and James Worrall added that the COA would probably bow to the pressure exerted by the OT and USOC vote.¹⁵⁰

The Government Decision

The new Liberal government officially opened its parliamentary session on 14 April. Joe Clark called on the government to make an early decision on the boycott situation. However, MacGuigan replied that the decision would be delayed until he conferred with other foreign ministers at the Zimbabwe independence ceremonies later in the week.¹⁵¹

The delay disappointed the Conservatives and they questioned Trudeau on the boycott the next day. Speaking in the House of Commons, Trudeau replied:

It doesn't take much courage just to announce that you're going to boycott the Olympics and it wouldn't have much effect either on the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It is perhaps a much more difficult policy to insure that this united front of nations... be maintained in as large a position as possible and that is what we're working on.¹⁵²

By 18 April Trudeau had given a more definite deadline. He announced the federal government would make public its boycott position before the COA met for its annual meeting on 26 April. Trudeau reported he was still waiting for MacGuigan to report from Zimbabwe on Canada's efforts to build a consensus on the boycott among the nations there.¹⁵³

This may have been part of the reason, but it is also interesting to note that the American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was scheduled to visit on 23 April and a spokesman for the Prime Minister admitted Vance was "pressuring" Canada to join the

¹⁵⁰ *Edmonton Journal*, 14 April 1980, p.12.

¹⁵¹ *Edmonton Journal*, 15 April 1980, p.A8.

¹⁵² *Edmonton Journal*, 16 April 1980, p.A9.

¹⁵³ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 19 April 1980, pp.1-2.

boycott.¹⁵⁴ If Canada was planning to boycott, it would appear much better if the decision was announced before Vance's visit, rather than afterward. If Trudeau announced his decision past 23 April, it would be interpreted as succumbing to American pressure, rather than making an independent decision.

The COA's Pound probably agreed with this when he stated it was inevitable that Canada would bow to the pressure of the USA and announce support for a boycott on 22 April. Said Pound: "I think the bottom line is that when your southern neighbour asks you to come along, there is not much you can do."¹⁵⁵

Pound's statement was completely accurate. Speaking in the House of Commons on 22 April, MacGuigan announced that the USSR action in Afghanistan made it completely inappropriate to hold the Games in Moscow and that the government would boycott the Games in retaliation for the invasion. Taking a strikingly different stance from the USA, MacGuigan added that the government would not use coercion, such as seizing passports or interfering with foreign travel to keep individuals from competing, but noted "if Canadian athletes participate in Moscow they will do so without the moral and financial support of the government of Canada."¹⁵⁶ In an effort to convince the public that it was a non-pressured decision, MacGuigan repeated that the government had been convinced through extensive consultations with Western and Third World countries that enough international support existed for an effective boycott. He was not specific, however.

The USA State Department was pleased (and probably relieved) by the announcement. It greeted the decision as "excellent news. . . we feel it is a courageous decision and the right one."¹⁵⁷ Vance honored his commitment and met government officials the next day.

Trudeau and MacGuigan insisted the decision was made to coincide with the West German boycott announcement, and to allow the COA an official government mandate at its annual meeting, not as a gesture to Vance.¹⁵⁸ Trudeau had finally made his decision but, because he had been forced to choose sides, it was entirely different from the one he

¹⁵⁴ *Edmonton Journal*, 19 April 1980, pp.A1;A3.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 23 April 1980, pp.1-2.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.2.

¹⁵⁸ Hal Quinn, "A 'dirty intrigue' heats up", *Maclean's*, 5 May 1980, p.39.

had initially advocated.

The COA Vote

It was now up to the COA to make the boycott decision official. In an unprecedented move the athletes were invited to give a presentation at the COA meeting. The general feelings of the athletes was probably summed up best by rower Larry Woods in a letter to the *Globe and Mail*. Wrote Woods:

The problem today is that, four years ago, many athletes decided that the price [to become an Olympian] while steep, was worth it. Each decided to pay this price just for the chance to own that mind-blowing, spine-tingling moment in time when he might march in Canada's colors, proudly into the Olympic stadium, his country's favorite son if only for a moment, to test himself against the best.

Every Canadian Olympic athlete would immediately relinquish his Olympic aspiration if he thought a boycott would make a significant difference, or if he looked around him and saw other Canadians making similar sacrifices. When such is not the case, he might be forgiven his belief that his presence at the Games, particularly a vociferous vocal presence that sought to raise the Russian and world consciousness with respect to his feelings about Afghanistan, might be more appropriate than an ill-conceived and partial boycott.¹⁵⁹

The feelings were reflected in both the athletes' vote and their presentation to the COA.

Twenty-four athletes from nineteen sports (strangely including winter sports as well as summer ones) met for two days to formulate their presentation to the COA. After an initial vote of 13 to 7 against the boycott, the athletes prepared a brief.¹⁶⁰ It was presented at the COA meeting on 27 April and its basic focus was reported in the following two paragraphs:

The government stated in a communique dated April 23, 1980 that "we believe the strongest possible stance must be taken against the USSR's action and its refusal to withdraw". To date, Canadian athletes fail to see the execution of government policies that are consistent with the stated seriousness of USSR's actions.

Based on our understanding of the government's position on the boycott issue at this time, a 2/3 majority are against boycotting the Moscow Olympics. If the strength and consistency which we feel should be part of our government's boycott position, both here at home and abroad, were in evidence along the lines of this brief, then a majority would support a boycott stand.¹⁶¹

After the presentation the COA held a secret ballot vote on the boycott proposal. If the athletes' presentation had an effect on the COA, it was not reflected in the vote. On 27 April the COA voted to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games by a count of 137 to 35. The official resolution passed by the COA stated:

¹⁵⁹ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 25 March 1980, p.7.

¹⁶⁰ "Minutes of a Meeting of Canadian Athletes", Montreal, 26 April 1980, p.2.

¹⁶¹ "Athletes Presentation to the COA Annual Meeting", Montreal, 26 April 1980, pp.1-2.

THAT because of the current international situation it would not be appropriate for Canadian athletes to participate in the Games of the XXII Olympiad and that in this regard the Canadian Olympic Association takes note of the advice of the Government of Canada that participation would be contrary to the national interest;

THAT accordingly the Canadian Olympic Association will not accept the invitation to participate in the Games of the XXII Olympiad;

THAT the Canadian Olympic Association notes with concern the fact that as a result of this decision, Canadian Olympic athletes appear to bear the principle consequences arising out of the current international situation.¹⁶²

It was not a surprising decision. Pound had stated three weeks earlier that the COA would comply with the wishes of the government. Since that time he and other officials had made repeated statements emphasizing the pressure placed on the COA in an effort to shift the accountability to Trudeau. Without making an outright statement, the COA had intimated that there was nothing it could do, so no one could place the blame on it. Rather, the COA appeared to be soliciting sympathy for its position.

In a noble and respectful gesture, the athletes accepted the decision and issued the following statement:

In the view of the boycott support by the COA, the athletes wish to assure the COA and others that we accept the decision, albeit sadly. In doing so, we wish to reiterate the views of our brief in the hope that the boycott will be meaningful in the cause of world peace, the Olympic movement and the athletes of our country.¹⁶³

Epilogue

The XXII Summer Olympics took place in Moscow between 19 July and 3 August 1980. The boycott was historically noted when IOC President Killanin altered the opening address to accommodate its impact. Killanin announced:

[I welcome] all athletes, especially those who showed their complete independence to travel and compete despite pressures on them.¹⁶⁴

During the running of the Games American President Carter held his own ceremony to document his perceived impact of the boycott. At an Olympic tribute held in Washington during the second week of the Games, attended by 380 Olympic athletes, Carter said: "It is no exaggeration to say that you have done more to uphold the Olympic ideal than any other group of athletes in our history."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² "Canadian Olympic Association Resolution", 27 April 1980, p.2.

¹⁶³ "Athletes Presentation to the COA Annual Meeting", Montreal, 26 April 1980, p.2.

¹⁶⁴ Diane K. Shah, "Olympics, Soviet Style", *Newsweek*, 28 July 1980, p.52.

¹⁶⁵ Stephen Smith, "A Warsaw Pact Picnic", *Time*, 11 August 1980, p.28.

The final boycott tally had 62 nations withdraw, including: Canada, the USA, West Germany, and Japan, the most ever that have refused to participate. Fewer than 6,000 athletes participated, half of the expected number, and only one-third of the expected 300,000 tourists showed up. Eighty-one nations competed (the lowest turn-out since the 1956 Melbourne Games which attracted only 67) and 16 of these refused to carry their national flags during the opening ceremonies. In this mute protest against the Afghan invasion, eight left their teams in the Olympic village; seven were represented by Games functionaries, and Dick Palmer, secretary of the British Olympic Association, was Great Britain's sole marcher. Significantly, the 17 athletes who comprised the Afghan team received one of the louder ovations of the opening ceremonies.¹⁶⁶

Canadian sport administrators rationalized their part in the boycott from a different perspective, suggesting it saved the nation considerable embarrassment. A Sport Canada official commented on the possibility of improving Canada's medal count of 11 (five silver and six bronze) from Montreal and suggested Canada would not have done nearly as well (possibly two gold and a chance for three to five silver and bronze). "In the end, Canada's Olympic pullout may [have been] a face saver."¹⁶⁷

However, the success of the boycott itself was a difficult matter to determine. Whether the Moscow Games were a defiant victory or an embarrassing failure depends on who was judging. The official Moscow line announced that the Games were a success, but the USA insisted the boycott worked.¹⁶⁸ Subjectively, it is difficult to measure the achievements of the Games and/or the boycott. However, there was one objective indicator that demonstrated what the boycott *failed* to achieve. At the time of the Games the USSR had not removed its troops from Afghanistan.

¹⁶⁶ Ron Firmite, "Only the Bears were Bullish", *Sports Illustrated*, 28 July 1980, p.12.

¹⁶⁷ Andy Shaw, "The Games People Don't Play", *Maclean's*, 28 July 1980, p.12.

¹⁶⁸ Keith Charles, "A City Under Siege", *Maclean's*, 4 August 1980, p.27.

Figure 1: Summary of Important Events

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
24–31 December, 1979	Invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR
28	Carter telexes Brezhnev with initial request for troop withdrawal
30	Rolf Pauls, West German ambassador to the UN suggests boycotting the Moscow Olympics
2 January, 1980	James Worrall, Canada's IOC member, says the government never "put pressure on the COA"
	Carter administration officials say the boycott is not a priority matter
4	Clark says he is opposed to a boycott because it would have "no practical effect" in Afghanistan
	Carter threatens to withdraw from the Moscow Olympics
7	Dick Pound, COA President, says the COA would defy a government decree to boycott the Games
11	Clark suggests that Canada would consider hosting the Games
14	UN votes 104 to 18 to "strongly deplore" the Afghan invasion
18	Canada revokes sports exchange protocol agreement with USSR
20	Carter announces a one-month deadline for withdrawal of Soviet troops or he will advocate that the Games be moved, cancelled or postponed
25	Clark declares for the first time he was seriously considering a boycott and a withdrawal of financial support for the COA
27	Clark announces he will follow the February 20 deadline and offers full support for a boycott
12 February	The IOC votes to reject any site change, cancellation or postponement

18	Trudeau and the Liberals win the Federal election. Trudeau refuses to advocate either side of the boycott issue
20	The deadline passes and Carter announces an American boycott of the Moscow Olympics
4 March	Trudeau delays a decision until the end of May
19	Mark MacGuigan says a decision will be reached by the end of April
30	The COA votes to attend Moscow but withholds formal acceptance until talks with the government are complete
31	The Olympic Trust threatens to withhold 1.7 million dollars in donations to the COA
2 April	Pound and Worrall meet with MacGuigan and Regan and announce the COA will follow the government's lead
12	USOC votes 1,604 to 797 to boycott the Moscow Games
14	The new parliamentary session opens
22	MacGuigan announces the Canadian government will boycott Moscow but will not use coercive tactics on the athletes
26	The Canadian athletes representative group votes 13-7 to oppose a boycott
27	The COA votes 137-35 to boycott the Moscow Games
19 July to 3 August	The Olympic Games are held in Moscow. Sixty-two nations boycott and 81 attend

IV. DISCUSSION

An Analysis of the American Boycott

USA-Implement

Exhibiting a consistency with the previous Modern Olympics Games (detailed in Chapter Two) the Moscow Games emerged as a partial reflection of the present world structure. The invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR prompted a Moscow–Washington clash which added to the already cool relations between the USSR and the USA. Obviously, the refusal of the American government to allow its athletes to attend the Soviet–based Olympics reflected this cooler relationship.

It was not surprising that the Carter administration called for a boycott as a punishment against the USSR. Not only have the Olympics evolved into a highly visible political event, but Carter's acceptance of a boycott as a political tool was demonstrated when he implemented it in 1978 against the USSR. It seemed evident that Carter had the boycott idea implanted in his mind long before the Afghanistan invasion. What was surprising was that it turned into virtually the only response.

The boycott was introduced as part of a package of retaliatory measures, but it soon became the one that gathered the most public support. This occurred for a variety of reasons. First, because the boycott would eventually cause only the Olympic athletes to make a sacrifice, this made much of the remainder of the American public willing to support a sanction that would not personally affect them. Second, the boycott was the most visible and least expensive of the sanctions. Third, and possibly most important, because Carter had experienced success with the boycott threat previously, and because there was initial public agreement, administration officials quickly fostered support of a boycott and this in turn caused many Americans to join the "majority" opinion.

The public support was too great for the president to ignore. Because he faced a strong challenge for renomination as the Democratic presidential candidate, Carter may have been attracted by the opportunity to implement a sanction that not only carried public accord, but that he had already had success with.

However, rather than exploiting the initial wave of American support by issuing a government order to boycott, Carter instead chose to initially respect the authority of the

USOC and trust that it would implement a boycott. The USOC stalled the decision for as long as possible, hoping for a breakthrough in Afghanistan. However, the delay of the official decision until April proved disastrous in the campaign for global support. For many governments, with each passing day, the urgency to respond to the invasion became less paramount and enthusiasm waned. There was simply too much time between the invasion and the Games, with too many national interests involved, for an international response to remain strong.¹

The delay also allowed the IOC to effectively counter the threat by refusing to alter the contract awarded to Moscow for the Games. This action enabled the USSR to *guarantee* that countries could participate in the Games. Carter could not match this, for he would not guarantee that boycotting countries would be involved in a *successful* venture.

The Final Verdict

Although the boycott gathered strong support in the USA, it did not gain *overwhelming* support worldwide, as evidenced by the Moscow turnout. This was partially due to the resolution by Carter to allow the USOC to make the final decision. The subsequent delay caused enthusiasm to decrease in many countries and other matters took priority over the boycott. Possibly the biggest problem with the boycott position was Carter's apparent lack of historical analysis and understanding of the Modern Olympic Games. The President did not seem to correctly interpret the global importance of the Games, or the immense pride held by the IOC and the NOC's in their "autonomous" positions. The irrevocable nature of the boycott threat, along with the pressure tactics applied to both the IOC and the USOC ultimately made the difference between the boycott being a "resounding" success, a "qualified" one, or a "failure".

The Carter process, designed to retaliate against a communist coup, was itself undemocratic. The athletes, while being forced to stay home, were used as pawns in Carter's foreign policy program. Additionally, the irrevocable nature of the position was unreasonable, for it denied any possibility of a solution.

Underneath the sentiments of Carter appeared to be a lack of historical analysis and understanding of the Olympic Movement. A large scale boycott has generally not

¹ Richard Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981) p.193.

achieved its desired goal in the history of the Modern Olympic Games.

An Analysis of the Canadian Boycott

Factors Affecting the Decision

The prestige and glory available through Olympic participation was a major condition for many nations in reaching their boycott decision, but this was not the case for Canada. There was a uniqueness to the factors which confronted Canada in its boycott determination mainly due to its geopolitical location with respect to the USA.

Geographically, Canada is situated alongside the USA. No other nation comes in direct contact with Canada's borders. This exclusive proximity to the USA contributes to a much greater feeling of "closeness" to the nation. Politically, Canada and the USA share the same basic ideologies; that is, they share similar assertions, theories and aims which constitute their political, social and economic programs. These two major factors have historically combined to make the countries close allies who share many advantages (such as mutually-beneficial economic agreements) between them. This association had a direct effect on the Canadian boycott decision.

Because of this connection, the influence of "prestige through participation" in the Olympics was lessened. Instead, the condition which had the greatest impact on Canada's decision was its unofficial duty to demonstrate its political alliance to the USA. Carter insisted on this when he turned the invasion into a Moscow-Washington confrontation, and then compelled Canada to take sides by presenting it as an East-West dispute. The decision for Canada was not whether or not the boycott was a viable sanction to employ against the USSR. That was academic. Rather, the decision for Canada was whether or not it *had* to support the USA with a boycott endorsement.

Group Pressures Affect Decision

The Canadian decision to boycott the Games seemed to be a purely political one. The sequence of events which led to the resolution indicate that the COA was politically pressured into joining the boycott against its own principles, against its own constitution, and against the wishes of a majority of athletes. Although it seems apparent that a majority of Canadians favored a boycott, there was never a nationwide poll, referendum

vote, or even opinion poll taken to verify this.² Because the COA was the only group who could officially support and enforce a Canadian boycott, it became the target of pressure from a combination of critical power groups who wanted Canada to boycott. The combination was formed among the Olympic Trust, the Canadian government, American businesses and the American government. The pressure was initiated when the USA first requested Canada's support for the boycott proposal, it climaxed during the OT threat of 31 March to 2 April, and it terminated when the federal government announced its support of the boycott.

The first trace of pressure came in the form of a personal message from Carter to Clark asking him to support the ultimatum.³ (In matters of concern between Canada and the USA, Canada is usually in an equal bargaining position. However, when a request for support concerns a world matter, it becomes more difficult for Canada to refuse the USA because it is perceived as a less powerful country. The boycott request fell into the latter category.) However, because Clark officially agreed to support Carter's stance in just seven days, it was not necessary for a stronger form of pressure to be applied at this stage.

The need for increased pressure did not reappear until the COA voted to attend the Moscow Games on 30 March.⁴ Although the COA had only attempted to show its political independence (by holding a vote and publicly expressing its disapproval of the boycott), it not only brought tremendous pressure on itself, but it also publicly displayed the magnitude of its financial and political vulnerability. This vulnerability was openly exploited by the OT, the Canadian government and the American government.

The OT applied financial pressure through its threat to withhold funds if the team was sent to Moscow. The OT also exerted pressure through political means when it urged the Canadian government to officially support the boycott and to ensure the COA complied. The combination of financial and political pressures had the desired effect, for it caused the COA to completely reverse its position. Only two days after the OT announcement, and three days after the COA vote, representatives of the federal

² See Chapter III: pp.55–56.

³ *New York Times*, 22 January 1980, pp.A1;A8.

⁴ Although the USA became concerned when Trudeau won the 18 February Federal election (and Canada's stance was put in doubt) there was no need to do anything drastic unless it seemed certain that Canada favored participation.

government met with representatives of the COA to request its consent to the government decision. The meeting ended with the COA announcement that it would obey the government boycott resolution. This demonstrated the power of the federal government and the ultimate dependence of the COA on governmental consent.⁵ Because the COA reversed its delegates' decision, it seems evident that the government had used coercion through pressure, and that this was a very powerful weapon against the COA. Even though the COA had the mandate of its own delegates (as indicated by the 30 March vote), and of its own constitution (which requires the delegates to act regardless of political pressure and to consistently support the Olympic movement)⁶, it did not have the consent of the government, and this exposed the COA's need for governmental approval.

It appears the USA was the cause of indirect pressure on the COA through both the OT and the Canadian government. It was mainly the American-owned firms, such as Simpson-Sears Ltd. and Eatons which requested the OT to withhold their substantial pledges if the team was sent to Moscow.⁷ It was also the American government that applied pressure on the Canadian government to ensure that Canada's athletes boycotted. Five-time world trap-shooting champion Susan Natrass, while rendering an account of an athletes meeting she attended with Fitness and Amateur Sport Minister Gerald Regan, stated:

There was absolutely no choice whatsoever. [Regan said] Washington had exerted so much pressure on the Prime Minister that we [Canada] had no choice, and that was two weeks before the COA vote.⁸

Thus, it seems evident that because of the American pressure exerted on Canada, the OT and the federal government were forced to ensure the COA would boycott. It appeared that by 2 April Canada had all but officially decided that it was necessary to support the actions of the USA.

The American government then applied one more method of pressure to secure the official government resolution. When Prime Minister Trudeau repeatedly delayed the decision Carter arranged for his Secretary of State to visit with Canadian officials to "discuss" the boycott. Since Trudeau knew a Canadian boycott was now inevitable, he

⁵ Because the official minutes of the meeting are presently unobtainable, it is impossible to detail the exact messages exchanged between the two parties.

⁶ *Edmonton Journal*, 9 April 1980, p.D12.

⁷ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 3 April 1980, p.51.

⁸ Susan Natrass, personal interview with author, 30 March 1982, Edmonton, Alberta.

probably felt that if the announcement came *after* the Secretary's visit it would be impossible to publicly deny that American pressure had forced Canada to boycott. Trudeau instead announced the "Canadian-derived" decision of governmental support for the boycott the day before the visit.

By this time there was no need to add any other form of pressure. The Canadian government had agreed to boycott and the COA had consented to follow the government lead. Five days later the COA fulfilled its promise and overwhelmingly voted to boycott the Moscow Olympics. In doing so, it went against the wishes of the majority of Canadian athletes who had voted to attend only the day before. The combined pressure from the critical power groups had been extremely effective in procuring the boycott support, but the methods through which it was applied left the COA's power and prestige weakened.

The Implications of the Decision

The decision by the Canadian government to boycott the Moscow Olympics was greatly influenced by the position taken by the government of the USA. For Canada, the boycott seemed to re-emphasize Canada's position as a supporter of the USA. Even though Trudeau had repeatedly stated that a boycott would not be an effective response to the Afghanistan invasion he inevitably supported the sanction. Trudeau had been a world leader for nearly ten years when the decision was reached. He understood Canada's position with respect to the USA. When pressure was implemented from the USA to support a global concern, it was very difficult for Canada to react without the effects of pressure being felt.

The mixing of sport and politics was not the real issue for Canada. Rather, it was whether or not it was possible for Canada to make an independent decision. It seems the verdict reached by Canada, for this specific incident, was that it was not. The message was filtered down to the COA, which also succumbed to government pressure. The COA had attempted to remain autonomous up to this point, but when politics became openly involved in sport, it became impossible to claim this anymore.

The Impact of the Boycott

Effects on the Olympic Movement

The Moscow Games and the year 1980 marked the coming of age for the Olympics, and not the beginning of their demise as some sport administrators and politicians had predicted. Rather than continuing as a sideshow of international politics, the Games emerged as the principal element. The Moscow Olympics solidified the view that the Games will continue until the superpowers of the world no longer find them interesting or useful. Because of the attention and significance attached to Moscow, it seems evident that the Games do serve a purpose.

The single greatest achievement of the boycott was to demonstrate how important *participation* in the Modern olympics has become over its 84 year history. Moscow verified the importance given to Olympic participation by governments, the public, and business interests. When the Games ended, the leaders of the boycotting nations probably realized that participation in the Games is everything, and that non-participation is a soon forgotten memory. The assumed glory of Moscow only existed for those who took part. It was perhaps this realization by the African leaders in 1976, after their Montreal boycott, that led to their lack of support for the Moscow boycott.⁹

This understanding should decrease mass boycotts in the future, but it should also assure Soviet participation in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. The USSR will not retaliate by boycotting in 1984, for it would have much more to gain by winning the Olympics on American soil than it would by withdrawing from them. Barring a global catastrophic event, the USSR will compete in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.

Effects on the Moscow Games

It is impossible to maintain that the boycott *did not* affect the Moscow Olympics. Due to the lack of world-wide participation, the worth of Moscow gold must be questioned. Three of the top five nations that had competed in Montreal in 1976 – the USA, West Germany, and Japan – boycotted in 1980 and this decreased the athletic excellence of the Games. For example, the winning times recorded during the USA's National Swimming Championships (held during the Moscow Olympics) would have gained

⁹ Espy, p. 176.

American swimmers 10 gold, 12 silver and 5 bronze medals when compared to the recorded times of the Moscow Games.¹⁰ Thus, even though 34 world records were set in Moscow, it still cannot be said that in 1980 the gold medal winners were the world's best. The question of "what if . . ." will always cloud the issue.

The magnitude of the Games, one of its most impressive aspects, was also affected. Refusals to the Moscow invitation came from 62 nations, the most ever that have ever declined to participate. Only one-half of the athletes and one-third of the tourists that were expected actually showed up. It was the lowest turnout at a Modern Olympic Games since 1956 when the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez Canal crisis caused many nations to boycott the Melbourne Games. The boycott caused Moscow to lose the international legitimacy normally provided to the Olympic host.

The boycott also made it impossible for the Soviet government to hide the global anger over Afghanistan from its citizens because the Games turned out to be largely reduced to a Warsaw Pact Games. It is doubtful whether citizens began to question the government policy of the USSR, but they probably became aware that many nations doubted the Soviet explanation of it.

Another impact of the boycott was its contribution to the lack of a "festive" atmosphere at Moscow. Writers attending the Games wrote of "regimented joylessness" and of the lack of "spontaneity and spirit".¹¹ The Games seemed too structured, too planned, to actually be deemed a sport "festival". Although the pressure of communism may have fostered this atmosphere, the controversy of the boycott may have inspired the planners to make absolutely certain that the actual Games ran problem-free.

Success or Failure?

Although the boycott caused many important changes to occur, in actuality they were all "side-effects". The primary reason for implementing the boycott was to motivate the Soviets to remove their troops from Afghanistan. It did not have the desired effect. If the boycott is to be measured solely on whether it accomplished what it set out to do, then it was a failure. The boycott was unsuccessful in influencing the Soviets to remove even one soldier from Afghanistan.

¹⁰ Christopher Booker, *The Games War: A Moscow Journal*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1981) p.196.

¹¹ Ibid., and Keith Charles, "The Tarnished Bowl", *Maclean's*, 11 August 1980, p.40.

But if the boycott is to be measured on what it did accomplish, then it could be judged as being a *qualified* success. Thus, depending on who was doing the judging, the boycott could have been a victory or a failure. It is difficult to assess who the real winners were, but it is much simpler to decide on the ultimate losers. They were the athletes – again.¹²

¹² Espy, p. 196.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

During the 84 year history of the Modern Olympic Movement the Games have evolved from a transnationalistic event to a nationalistic encounter. Because the structure of the Olympics was politicized from its inception, the Movement became ideally suited to serve as an exploitable political forum. As nations acquired a greater interest in the Games, principally due to the glory and prestige they offered, the Olympics grew in size and stature and developed into an event of global importance. Along the way, the Olympics fell under the influence and control of international trends, conflicts and events. The Games became a mirror of the world's political problems.

However, with the possible exception of the 1936 Games, the Olympics never captured the centre spotlight of international politics until the boycott crisis of the 1980 Summer Olympics. When Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR in December 1979, it unintentionally became the catalyst for the most blatant sport-politics clash in Modern Olympic history. The invasion caused a Moscow-Washington clash and American President Jimmy Carter, who had experienced success against the Soviets with a 1978 boycott threat, called for a massive Western boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games.

The nation of Canada, because of its geopolitical location with respect to the USA, and because of its historical background as a strong ally of the USA, became involved in the boycott sanction. When it seemed possible that Canada would participate in Moscow, the USA was forced to apply financial and political pressures in order to assure boycott compliance. In turn, Canadian groups passed the pressure to the COA but in doing so, they weakened the professed power and autonomy of the COA. In the end, the Canadian decision to boycott was reached as a result of the political and financial pressure exerted upon it by a number of critical power groups.

The major hypothesis, that the COA decided to support the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games because of the pressure exerted on it by a number of critical power groups, was supported. Specifically, the critical power groups mentioned in the related hypotheses were the ones found to support the statement.

First, the hypothesis that the American government exerted pressure on the Canadian government was partially supported. Not only did the American government privately state that Canada should support the USA (as noted by Minister Regan), but it also sent a government representative, Cyrus Vance, to publicly request support. Second, the hypothesis that the Canadian government exerted pressure on the COA to boycott was strongly supported. Only three days after the COA had voted to send a team to Moscow, its officials were requested to meet with government representatives. When the meeting ended the COA announced it would support the position of the government.

Third, the hypothesis that American businesses exerted pressure on the OT was also strongly supported. It was mainly the American-owned firms such as Simpson Sears Ltd. and Eatons which requested that their substantial pledges be withheld if a Canadian team was sent to Moscow. This left the OT unable to totally finance an Olympic team. Finally, the hypothesis that the OT exerted pressure on the COA was found to be strongly supported. Just one day after the COA had voted to send a team to Moscow, the OT threatened to withhold 1.7 million dollars in donations, and this left the COA without any funds. Additionally, the OT lobbied the government to ensure support of the boycott by the COA. This helped to set up the meeting which led to the compliance of the COA to the government's position.

Ultimately, due to the combination of pressure from the American government, American businesses and the OT, the COA was forced to support the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games.

Conclusions

Presented below are the conclusions derived from the study:

The Olympic Games

1. The increase in both the size of the Games and in the magnitude of the protests which have unsettled the Games demonstrate that the Olympics have become a principal element in international politics.
2. The direct reflection of current global problems in the Olympic Games demonstrates not only the interrelationship between sport and politics, but that change for one in isolation of the other is impossible. Although it is not necessary

to promote this fact, it appears incredulous for sport administrators to deny it.

3. The importance that politicians have attached to the Olympic Games verifies their interest and usefulness to the great powers.
4. The protests of the Modern Games have served to illustrate that the ideal of the Games – that of creating international respect and goodwill in order to construct a better and more peaceful world – is somewhat fallacious. This should no longer be strongly moralized.

The Boycott

5. The implementation of the Olympic boycott by the USA as the major sanction against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan aided in demonstrating how the Olympics serve to maintain the balance of forces between the great powers.
6. The failure of the boycott to induce the desired change demonstrated the inability of the measure to achieve its goal. In general, the majority of Olympic boycotts have not achieved the objectives of their protagonists.
7. Because the boycott by Canada and the USA denied the individual rights of its citizens to participate in the Olympics it was itself an undemocratic process.

Canada

8. The compliance of the COA to governmental demands served to indicate the ultimate political control of the association by the federal government.
9. The COA decision to boycott was largely due to the combination of pressure from the American government, Canadian government, American businesses, and the Olympic Trust.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that a follow-up study be undertaken on the development of the Canadian boycott when more primary information becomes available. It is also suggested that interviews of those individuals who were directly involved in the decision take place. Such a study may allow the intricacies of the decision to be better understood.
2. It is also recommended that a detailed study on the development of political trends in the Modern Olympic Games be undertaken.

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VII. APPENDICES

Minutes of a Meeting of Canadian Athletes

Held at the Sheraton Mount-Royal Hotel, Montreal, Quebec on April 25-26, 1980 commencing at 19:30 to 23:30 on April 25 and commencing at 9:00 to 14:30 on April 26.

Athletes Present:

Ms. Terry Leibel (Equestrian)	Mr. Mark Lavoie (Fencing)
Ms. Christilot Boylen (Equestrian)	Mr. Brad Farrow (Judo)
Ms. Joan McDonald (Archery)	Mr. Larry Woods (Yachting)
Mr. Steven Bauer (Cycling)	Mr. Evert Bastet (Yachting)
Mr. Fred Hoos (Field Hockey)	Mr. Sean Barry (Wrestling)
Mr. Ken Read (Skiing)	Ms. Karen Lukanovich (Canoeing)
Ms. Susan Nattrass (Shooting)	Ms. Lucie Guay (Canoeing)
Mr. Guy Lorion (Shooting)	Mr. Bruce Simpson (Track and Field)
Mr. Barry Kennedy (Modern Pentathlon)	Mr. Paul Craig (Track and Field)
Mr. Anthony Pompeo (Modern Pentathlon)	Ms. Joy Fera (Rowing)
Ms. Sylvia Burka (Speed Skating)	Mr. Roger Fortin (Boxing)
Ms. Deborah Albright (Figure Skating)	Mr. Paul Gratton (Volleyball)

Mr. Bruce Simpson was Chairman of the meeting, and Mr. Victor Emery was Secretary.

Including the writer, there were 25 attendees with no outsiders at any time.

The meeting was opened by the COA's appointed volunteer resource person, Mr. Victor Emery, who covered various matters of housekeeping and answered general questions re reasons, the current situation and the COA's genuine desire/need for athlete input.

The 24 athletes in attendance then identified themselves in turn and the positions from which they would each be speaking. This identification revealed that all of the attendees were current athletes, almost all had researched in detail the boycott issue with their peers in their respective sport disciplines – 19 in all. They would therefore in part and in whole be speaking for the majority of elite athletes across the country. This revelation set the stage for a meeting which was all business from start to finish in a valiant effort to represent properly all those who were not in the room.

After much discussion on what the meeting should attempt to achieve and the value of a preliminary reading of the group's position on the boycott issue, an open poll was decided upon (intimidation not being the expressed concern of anyone in the room). The result showed a weighting of 13 sports to 7 against supporting the boycott which included a telegram from the divers.

Each athlete in turn then presented in a few minutes his or her (sport's) position on the boycott issue.

The group then attempted to determine how best to proceed from this base of information. There was much deliberation about the merits of attempting to achieve one majority or consensus position as opposed to two (majority/minority) positions.

It was finally decided, following recognition of some areas of agreement, that the two groups should separate and outline areas of importance within a predetermined format. The idea was to attempt to arrive at common ground where the two statements were close to one another and, then to extend this accommodation to a specific boycott position if at all possible. It was felt that such an approach was desirable so that the ultimate brief would be of maximum help to the COA members and, similarly to, Canadian athletes.

Approximately half way through Saturday morning, the groups came together again for a discussion of the draft statements.

As agreement was reached on each matter, two or three members were assigned the final drafting. Thus the entire brief came together with the exception of the athletes' position on the specific boycott question. The discussion was ensued and an open vote in that connection produced the remainder of the brief to the COA meeting.

As further input to this part of the discussion, Susan Nattrass, Joan McDonald and Victor Emery attended the Federal Minister of Sport's meeting with the COA membership and were able to query Mr. Regan on certain aspects of the Government's position on the boycott and actions with respect to it.

Susan Nattrass, Sean Barry and Bruce Simpson were suggested for presentation of the brief to the COA meeting. After they left the room, a narrow margin resulted in Bruce Simpson's appointment as spokesman.

Prior to leaving the room for the COA meeting, the group agreed to reconvene following the COA vote with the view to adding an appropriate addendum prior to the press conference to follow.

The athletes' brief was very well received by the meeting at large and seemed to synthesize many of the members' concerns. Particularly appreciated was the lack of recrimination and sacrifice type language in the brief and the athletes' willingness to be part of a cause so long as it was meaningful. Also appreciated was Larry Woods' eloquent appeal from the floor, following certain misinformed speakers.

As an aside, without having gone through the process of the athletes' meeting and the

COA decision on the matter, it is almost impossible to understand the complexity of the issue. It is your secretary's opinion that the athletes' sober and reflective position did much to bridge the gap that too long has existed between the competitors and the administrators and will do much to assure a stronger voice from those affected in the future.

In this same spirit the athletes adopted a position of maximum credibility and responsibility in the addendum to the brief, following the 137 to 35 vote in support of the government's boycott position. Then Susan Nattrass was appointed spokeswoman to the press conference at which she read the brief and answered questions superbly including, ironically, who she was and how to spell her name (they still didn't get it right), supported by Bruce Simpson. (It is interesting to note that the vote was about the same as the national average based on mail received in Ottawa.)

On Sunday morning the COA deliberated on a draft resolution regarding the boycott issue. At least in part because of the athletes' brief and the arguments put forward from the floor by Sean Barry, Bruce Simpson and Victor Emery at that meeting, the paragraph dealing with the COA's concern regarding the principle burden is included. Ideally, it would be preferable for the public to recognize what is being asked of the Olympic athletes; however, without some prodding by the COA, it was generally agreed that the matter of consistent treatment could slip between the chairs. The government's position on a broadening of the boycott has been to effect maximum visibility in the Soviet Union as opposed to spreading hardship here at home and a cutting off of all ties which could be hard to reestablish. In the same vein the athletes group agreed internally that they didn't want to penalize other athletes or programmes just because they were being penalized. Notwithstanding, highly-visible events like the Canada Cup and Skate Canada make the sacrifice appear to be a farce to the unenlightened and so there appeared to be general agreement that such types of events should be scrubbed if we are to have solidarity at home.

With apologies for the asides and elaborations, and gratitude for sharing this historic deliberation with a great group of Canadians – this

Respectfully submitted,

Victor Emery

P.S. The minutes have not been detailed in the area of controversy or individual statements in the presumption that same will receive some circulation outside of the group.

Athletes Presentation to the COA Annual Meeting, April 26, 1980 Regarding Boycott Issue

Twenty-four athletes representing 19 sports disciplines and the majority of elite athletes in each of those disciplines, therefore representing a majority of elite athletes across the country, deliberated on Friday evening and Saturday morning, April 25 to 26 on the boycott issue and reached the following conclusions.

As athletes, we would like to thank the COA for giving us this opportunity to express our views. We greatly appreciate your support in bringing us together and enabling us to provide input into the decision-making process.

The government stated in a communique dated April 23, 1980 that "We believe the strongest possible stance must be taken against the USSR's action and its refusal to withdraw". To date Canadian athletes fail to see the execution of government policies that are consistent with the stated seriousness of the USSR's actions.

We feel that our government should be taking a more decisive and consistent stand in protest to the USSR. Present token government policies fail to exhibit a broad and equitable approach. This is evidenced by a lack of economic trade sanctions and an inconsistency in cultural exchanges and sporting events. It is totally inappropriate and contrary to stated government policy that the Canada Cup and Skate Canada be allowed to continue under the present circumstances.

In 1976, Canada's position, with respect to political and boycott activity relating to the Olympics, was extremely clear. The boycott was totally unacceptable. The same year, our government asked its amateur athletes to strive for the attainment of athletic excellence, that would have as its ultimate goal, competent participation in the 1980 Games. Canadian amateur athletes accepted that commitment and fulfilled its demanding requirements and resent the attempt to remove the goal for which they have strived.

Sport and politics have been inseparable. Throughout the history of the modern Games, there has been international turmoil. The situation in 1980 is only different to a degree.

A boycott of the 1980 Games could mean the termination of the Olympic Games as we know them today. Boycotts in the past, as the primary weapon of protest, have proven to be extremely ineffective.

The Olympics are a unique sporting event with no parallel, allowing both individuals from different nations and different sports disciplines close personal contact. International understanding and communication is thereby promoted.

Alternate games would not be acceptable as a replacement for the Olympics. However, Olympic trial selections should proceed as the international political situation could change.

It is absolutely imperative that the International Olympic Committee and the National Olympic Committees address themselves immediately to resolving the extreme intrusion of politics into the Olympic Games in the 1980's.

The statements just presented were reached unanimously by the athletes' group after considerable deliberation. However, the group was unable to reach a unanimous decision either for or against the boycott. Based on our understanding of the government's position on the boycott issue at this time, a 2/3 majority are against boycotting the Moscow Olympics. If the strength and consistency which we feel should be part of our government's boycott position, both here at home and abroad, were in evidence along the lines of this brief, then a majority would support a boycott stand.

17:30 Hours, April 26, 1980

The foregoing was provided to the COA meeting for its deliberations this afternoon. In view of the boycott support by the COA, the athletes wish to assure the COA and others that we accept the decision, albeit sadly. In so doing, we wish to reiterate the views of our brief in the hope that the boycott will be meaningful in the cause of world peace, the Olympic movement, and the athletes of our country.

Canadian Olympic Association Resolution, 27 April 1980

WHEREAS the Canadian Olympic Association has received an invitation from the Organizing Committee of the Games of the XXII Olympiad;

WHEREAS pursuant to the Olympic Charter the Canadian Olympic Association as the National Olympic Committee in Canada must indicate to the Organizing Committee whether or not it intends to participate before May 24, 1980;

WHEREAS the International Olympic Committee, the General Assembly of International Federations and the Executive Council of the Association of National Olympic Committees have confirmed that the Games of the XXII Olympiad should proceed as planned in Moscow;

WHEREAS the Canadian Olympic Association has, under the provisions of the Olympic Charter, the sole responsibility to decide whether to accept or refuse invitations to the Olympic Games, after consultation with its members, the majority of whom represent federations whose sport is on the Olympic Programme;

WHEREAS the Canadian Olympic Association has consulted with representatives of Canadian Olympic Athletes;

WHEREAS the members of the Canadian Olympic Association have carefully considered all the factors which enter into a decision as to whether or not, in the present international circumstances, Canadians should participate in the Games of the XXII Olympiad;

WHEREAS each member of the Canadian Olympic Association has reached a decision conscious of his or her responsibilities to the Olympic Movement, amateur sport and Canadian athletes, as well as to his or her responsibilities as a Canadian citizen;

AFTER DUE DELIBERATION the Canadian Olympic Association hereby RESOLVES

THAT it deeply regrets the international situation which now exists as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan by armed forces of the Soviet Union;

THAT it joins the International Olympic Committee in calling upon the governments of all countries, and in particular those of the major powers, to come together to resolve their differences so that the Games of the XXII Olympiad can take place in the right atmosphere;

THAT it completely rejects the proposition that either the awarding of the Games of the XXII Olympiad to Moscow or participation in such Games is in any way a vindication of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union;

THAT because of the current international situation it would not be appropriate for Canadian athletes to participate in the Games of the XXII Olympiad and that in this regard the Canadian Olympic Association takes note of the advice of the Government of Canada that participation would be contrary to the national interest;

THAT accordingly the Canadian Olympic Association will not accept the invitation to participate in the Games of the XXII Olympiad;

THAT the Canadian Olympic Association notes with concern the fact that as a result of this decision, Canadian Olympic athletes appear to bear the principle consequences arising out of the current international situation;

THAT the Canadian Olympic Association reserves the right to reassess the present

decision in the light of a change in circumstances which might indicate that it would become appropriate to participate in the Games of the XXII Olympiad;

THAT notwithstanding any final decision not to participate, the Canadian Olympic Association will select and honour the athletes who comprise the Canadian team for the Games of the XXII Olympiad, to recognize their commitment to excellence in sport and the sacrifice which has been thrust upon them by any decision not to compete in the Games.

National Olympic Committees, Rule 24, Olympic Rules and Regulations, 1955

National Olympic Committees

24. Only National Olympic Committees recognized and approved by the International Olympic Committee may enter competitors in the Olympic Games. Therefore, in order that contestants from a country can participate in the Olympic Games, a National Olympic Committee, conducting its activities in accordance with these Olympic regulations and the high ideals of the Olympic Movement, must be organized and accepted by the I.O.C.

National Olympic Committees shall have as their purpose, the development and protection of the Olympic Movement and of amateur sport. They shall cooperate with the national amateur sport governing bodies affiliated to the international federations recognized by the International Olympic Committee, in guarding and enforcing amateur rules. They shall have the exclusive right to use the Olympic flag and Olympic insignia, and shall confine their use and as far as possible that of the words "Olympic" and "Olympiad" to activities concerned with the Olympic Games (all commercial use of the Olympic flag and Olympic insignia is strictly forbidden). It is their duty, in cooperation with the national sport governing bodies (national federations), to organize and control the team that will represent their country in the Olympic Games. They shall arrange to equip, transport and house this team. They are patriotic organizations not for pecuniary profit, devoted to the promotion and encouragement of the physical, moral and cultural education of the youth of the nation, for the development of character, good health and good citizenship.

They shall enforce all the rules and regulations of the I.O.C.

National Olympic Committees must be completely independent and autonomous and entirely removed from political, religious or commercial influence.

Because of the importance of National Olympic Committees which are in charge of the Olympic Movement in their countries, great care must be exercised in choosing members, who should be men of good standing, upright character, sound judgement, independent mind, and a knowledge and belief in Olympic principles.

They must include in their membership:

- a. the members of the International Olympic Committee to that country, if any;
- b. at least one representative of proved service to his sport, nominated by each recognized national federation (association or governing body), whose sport is included in the Olympic Games programme. Individuals of this category must constitute a voting majority of the committee.

The following are not eligible to serve on a National Olympic Committee:

- a. A person who has ever competed as a professional;
- b. A person engaged in or connected with sport for personal profit; (It is not intended to exclude individuals occupying purely administrative positions in connection with amateur sport.)
- c. A person who has ever coached for payment.

A N.O.C. must not recognize more than one national federation in each sport and that federation must belong to the International Federation recognized by the I.O.C.

The members and officers of the N.O.C. and the members of its Executive Committee shall be elected at least every four years, at a N.O.C. meeting held expressly for that purpose. They may coopt in limited number to the Committee, persons who have

rendered or can render exceptional service to the Olympic Movement.

Members of National Olympic Committees shall accept no salary or fee of any kind because of their position. They may, however, accept reimbursement for transportation, lodging and other proper expenses incurred by them in connection with their duties.

National Olympic Committees are responsible for the social and sport behavior of their athletes and officials.

The National Olympic Committee is the official organization in full and complete charge of all Olympic matters in its own country. It handles all arrangements for taking part in the Olympic Games. All communications on such matters shall be addressed to it.

In order to obtain recognition, the rules and regulations, constitution and by-laws of National Olympic Committees, with a certified copy in French or English, must be sent to and approved by the International Olympic Committee. Any changes, not in accordance with I.O.C. rules and regulations, made in the constitution or by-laws must be reported to and approved by the International Olympic Committee.

In the event of any regulations or actions of the N.O.C. conflicting with the I.O.C. rules, the I.O.C. member in that country must report the situation to the President of the I.O.C. for appropriate action. If there is no I.O.C. member in the country, the President has the power to appoint a member from another country to investigate and report to him.

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